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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
If capital markets were perfect, borrowing firms would 
obtain funds from lenders based upon the true value and risk 
associated with the projects for which they seek financing. 
However, information asymmetries which exist in capital 
markets hamper this transfer of funds. Asymmetric 
information refers to the inequality of information among 
market participants. A borrowing firm usually has access to 
superior information about potential returns and risks 
associated with the projects for which they seek financing. 
This information is referred to as private information. 
Prospective investors would benefit from the knowledge of 
the true characteristics of the borrowing firm, however 
information asymmetries result in problems, such as the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, that inhibit 
this direct transfer of private information. 
Adverse selection occurs when the borrower who is most 
likely to produce an undesirable outcome is the borrower who 
most actively seeks financing from lenders. In the context 
of raising funds in capital markets, a borrowing firm has an 
incentive to overstate the quality of their projects in 
order to obtain a lower cost of funds. Verification of the 
1 
true characteristics of the borrowing firm by prospective 
investors, who are informationally disadvantaged, may be 
costly or even impossible. As a result, information 
transfer may not occur, which could lead to market failure. 
2 
Moral hazard problems occur when the borrower has an 
incentive to engage in activities after contracting that are 
undesirable from the perspective of the lender. For 
instance, a borrowing firm may pursue projects after 
obtaining funds from uninformed lenders which offer the 
potential for higher rewards, but also have a higher degree 
of risk. These activities increase the likelihood that the 
borrowing firm will be unable to repay the loan. Since 
lenders are aware of these potential moral hazard problems, 
they may forego providing capital for profitable investment 
opportunities, thereby resulting in an inefficient transfer 
of funds in capital markets. 
Previous studies such as Dann and Mikkelson (1984), 
Eckbo (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Kowar 
(1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986), have documented non-
positive stock price responses associated with public 
security offerings. In general, these studies suggest that 
investors infer negative information about the borrowing 
firm as a result of information asymmetry problems 
associated with public security offerings. Miller and Rock 
(1985) suggest that unexpected external security offerings 
indicate less than expected internally generated cash flows, 
thus resulting in negative stock price responses to 
3 
announcements of security issuances. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) suggest that managers have access to superior 
information regarding the true value of the borrowing firm. 
They argue that managers can exploit their inside 
information by issuing securities in capital markets when 
their firm is overvalued. Investors recognize this 
incentive and infer negative information about the value of 
the borrowing firm at the announcement of a security 
issuance. In the absence of an unambiguous signal regarding 
true value, high quality borrowing firms will be paid less 
for their securities than the price associated with the true 
value of the firm. 
Borrowing firms may instead utilize private placements 
of debt to signal positive information about their future 
prospects to market participants. A private placement is a 
security issue that is directly sold to selected 
institutional investors. Private placements of debt are 
exempt from registration and disclosure requirements of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, 
details of the private placement agreement are not 
necessarily made publicly available. These factors 
contribute to the confidential nature of the private 
placement market, because in many cases the terms of the 
issue, as well as the lender participating in the private 
placement agreement are not made publicly available. 
We hypothesize that reputable lenders in private 
placements of debt, such as insurance companies, provide 
4 
services which are viewed by the market as a signal about 
the true value of the borrowing firm. One of the primary 
reasons the SEC does not require registration and public 
disclosure of information in private placements of debt is 
that lenders in this market are assumed to have the 
sophistication and expertise necessary to evaluate the 
borrowing firm's securities without SEC intervention (Fields 
and Mais, 1991). We hypothesize that insurance companies 
have developed a reputation associated with their lending 
activities in this market and other market participants 
infer positive information about the borrowing firm based 
upon the knowledge that an insurance company is 
participating in the private placement. 
The certification and monitoring roles of reputable 
lenders in private placement of debt may help to alleviate 
adverse selection problems associated with security 
offerings. Through the process of negotiating the terms of 
the private placement, potential lenders are given access to 
private information about the financial prospects of the 
borrowing firm. Lenders in private placements then evaluate 
the debt issue based upon private information supplied by 
the borrowing firm. Completion of the private placement 
indicates the lender is willing to risk their reputational 
capital by providing financing to the borrowing firm, thus 
providing a signal to other market participants regarding 
the true value of the firm. 
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Private placements of debt may also result in effective 
monitoring of borrowing firms that will help alleviate moral 
hazard problems. Lenders in private placements of debt are 
given access to private information about the firm's 
financial prospects and condition covenants on the basis of 
this private information. Covenants can be written that 
address special concerns of the lenders. 
Smith and Warner (1979) observe that private placements 
of debt tend to have more restrictive covenants than public 
debt issues. They suggest that agency problems are less 
costly to resolve in private placements than public debt 
offerings. Because there are more investors participating 
in a public debt offering than a private placement of debt, 
investors will take smaller positions of the debt issue 
(Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988). As a result, there is the 
possibility of duplication of monitoring expense associated 
with public debt offerings where all lenders expend 
resources monitoring the borrowing firm or, 
alternatively, the free rider problem where a lender 
receives the benefits of monitoring without incurring 
monitoring costs. 
In private placements of debt, private information is 
revealed to a small number of lenders, particularly given 
that many private placements of debt have only one 
participating lender. The lender then conditions covenants 
on the basis of this private information and monitors the 
activitiesof the borrowing firm during the life of the bond 
contract. With a single lender monitoring the borrowing 
firm in private placements of debt, the free rider problem 
and the problem of duplication of monitoring costs are 
virtually eliminated. 
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The wealth impact associated with private placement 
offerings has not been examined extensively in the 
literature. However, recent studies suggest that private 
placements can result in a stock price response altogether 
different from those associated with public security 
offerings. In contrast to the negative stock price response 
associated with public equity offerings, Wruck (1989) found 
announcements of private placements of equity resulted in a 
positive stock price response. Studies which examined the 
wealth impact of private placements of debt have found mixed 
results. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) found 
non-positive, insignificant stock price responses for 
private placements of debt made by industrial borrowing 
firms. It should be noted that the emphasis of these 
studies was on public offerings and bank loans respectively 
and these studies did not explore any cross-sectional 
variation in their sample of private placements. 
Szewczyk and Varma (1991) found a significantly 
positive stock price response associated with private 
placements of debt by public utility borrowing firms. They 
suggest that the benefits associated with private placements 
of debt help to reduce information asymmetries associated 
with security issues. However, Asquith and Mullins (1986) 
and Masulis and Kowar (1986) found that the excess returns 
resulting from security offerings by utilities are less 
negative than those associated with industrial firms. The 
implication is that utility regulation, rather than the 
benefits associated with private placements, may help to 
reduce inf~rmation asymmetries associated with private 
placements of debt by utilities. 
7 
The role of lenders participating in private placements 
of debt has not been addressed in previous empirical 
studies. The identity of the lender in the private 
placement of debt may provide positive information to the 
market about the borrowing firm, particularly given the 
confidential nature of the private placement market. During 
the negotiating process associated with private placements 
of debt, private information about the financial prospects 
of the borrowing firm is revealed to the lender. Completion 
of the private placement indicates that on the basis of 
their evaluation of private information, a specified lender 
is willing to provide financing and monitor the activities 
of the borrowing firm during the loan. High quality 
borrowing firms may, therefore, signal their true value to 
the market by announcing that they have placed debt 
privately with a reputable lender. If the market perceives 
that a particular category of lender has developed a 
reputation of providing more valuable services relative to 
other lenders in the private placement market, then a 
positive stock price response would be expected for that 
8 
type of lender. James (1987) and Szewczyk and Varma (1991) 
identify insurance companies as the primary lender in 
private placements of debt. In addition, bonds comprise the 
largest component of insurance companies' asset portfolios. 
Maher (1989) suggests that because of these factors 
insurance companies have developed a reputation of providing 
expert credit evaluation among the categories of lenders in 
the private placement of debt market. 
There are many similarities between the role of 
insurance companies as lenders .in private placements of debt 
and the bank lending process. Banks have developed a 
reputation of providing valuable certification and 
monitoring services associated with their lending 
activities. Insurance companies perform similar roles in 
private placements of debt, since they evaluate the 
borrowing firm on the basis of private information and 
monitor the activities of the firm throughout the life of 
the bond contract. Given the short-term nature of bank 
loans, the renewal process provides banks with recourse 
because borrowing firms must submit themselves to periodic 
evaluation in order to renew credit agreements. Although 
private placements of debt are not renewed, insurance 
companies can purchase the common stock of the borrowing 
firm and thus affect the firm's activities throughout the 
loan. This provides insurance companies with a mechanism of 
recourse similar to the short-term renewal process 
associated with bank loans. 
James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) found a 
positive stock price response associated with announcements 
of new bank loans and renewals to existing bank loans 
respectively. These studies suggest that the bank lending 
process provides positive information to the market about 
the borrowing firm which helps to alleviate information 
asymmetries inherent in the securities issuance process. 
Since insurance companies provide services similar to those 
associated with bank loans, we hypothesize that 
announcements of private placements of debt to an insurance 
company may provide the market with a positive signal about 
the value of the borrowing firm. 
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Private placements of debt are sometimes arranged 
directly between borrowers and lenders without the 
assistance of investment bankers. However, in many cases 
borrowing firms will utilize an investment banker to provide 
advice during the private placement process. Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), Hughes (1986), and Smith and Booth (1986) 
suggest that investment bankers perform a valuable role in 
security issuance by certifying that the issue price is 
consistent with private information. Investment bankers 
have reputational capital at stake since they underwrite and 
advise many different issues over time. As a result, 
investment bankers earn a return based upon the reputation 
they develop. Slovin, Sushka and Hudson (1990) found that 
the more valuable the reputation of the investment banker, 
the greater the value of the certification services they 
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provide. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) suggest that in 
addition to certification services, investment banking firms 
provide valuable monitoring services during the security 
issuance process, where monitoring is defined as 
investigating the borrowing firm with the objective of 
improving performance. They suggest that monitoring by 
reputable investment banking firms helps reduce agency 
costs. This study will examine the impact of a firm's 
choice of investment banking firm during the private 
placement process. If prestigious investment banking firms 
are perceived as providing more valuable monitoring and 
certification services, then utilization of prestigious 
investment banking firms in the private placement process 
should have a favorable impact on firm value. Furthermore, 
the importance of the role of investment bankers will be 
examined in the context of private placements of debt to an 
insurance company. 
Wruck (1989), Szeczyk and Varma (1991) and Fields and 
Mais (1991) state that in some instances there is more than 
one lender participating in a single private placement of 
debt, although the number of lenders participating in 
private placements of debt are small in comparison to public 
debt offerings. The stock price response associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt may be related 
to the number of lenders participating in the private 
placement. Private placements which specify more than one 
lender indicate that the borrowing firm has provided private 
11 
information to more than one specified lender. Completion 
of the private placement indicates the confidence of the 
lenders in the future prospects of the borrowing firm, which 
may send a positive signal to the market about the value of 
the borrowing firm. There are also costs associated with 
having several lenders participating in a single private 
placement. Private information about the borrowing firm is 
revealed to more lenders, thus diminishing the advantage of 
privacy of information associated with the private placement 
market. There is also the possibility of duplication of 
monitoring efforts and costs, since several lenders will be 
performing monitoring activities. Private placements of 
debt which specify more than one participating lender may 
also result in free rider problems, where other market 
participants receive the benefits of monitoring without 
incurring monitoring costs. Therefore, this study will 
investigate the role of the number of lenders participating 
in private placements of debt in which the lender is 
specified. 
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter I 
provides an introduction to the private placement market and 
develops a rationale for studying the wealth impact of 
lenders participating in private placements of debt. 
Chapter II reviews the literature regarding theories of 
financial intermediation and the capital market's response 
to various types of security offerings and presents 
hypotheses to be tested. Chapter III provides an 
12 
explanation of the data collection process and the methods 
to be used. Chapter IV presents the empirical results of 
the study and provides an explanation regarding the 
implications of these results. Chapter V contains a summary 
of the empirical results, conclusions that were drawn based 
upon these results, and implications for future research. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews theoretical studies which have 
examined the benefits associated with financial 
intermediation since the primary lenders in private 
placements of debt are financial intermediaries. In 
addition, empirical studies are discussed which have 
examined the wealth impact associated with public debt 
offerings, the benefits of bank loans, and the role of 
investment banking firms in security offerings. A 
description of private placements of debt is presented along 
with a comparison of private placements of debt, public debt 
offerings and bank loans. This chapter concludes with a 
review of recent studies which examined the stock price 
response associated with announcements of private placements 
and the importance of the role of lenders in private 
placements of debt. 
Role of Financial Intermediaries 
in Capital Markets 
Leland and Pyle (1977) have developed a theory of 
financial intermediation based upon information asymmetries 
13 
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which exist in capital markets. Borrowers typically have 
superior information regarding projects for which they seek 
financing. Lenders would benefit from the knowledge of the 
true value of these projects, but there is an incentive 
for borrowers to exaggerate the positive qualities of their 
projects in order to achieve potentially substantial 
rewards. Verification of the true characteristics of the 
projects by the lender may be costly or even impossible. 
Information transfer may not occur, thus leading to 
potential market failure. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that information 
transfer may occur if the actions of persons with inside 
information can be observed. The willingness of an 
individual borrower to invest in his own project may serve 
as a signal regarding the true quality of the project. The 
borrower knows the true quality of the project, therefore 
the willingness of the borrower to invest in his project 
sends a credible signal to the market regarding that true 
value. Lenders will then value the project based upon the 
willingness of the borrower to invest in the project. This 
implies that high concentration of ownership in projects by 
borrowers conveys positive information to the capital 
market. Thus, firm value increases with the portion of the 
firm held by the borrower. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that their findings have 
direct applicability to the existence of financial 
intermediaries in capital markets. Financial intermediation 
15 
can be viewed as a natural response to informational 
asymmetries. There is something intrinsic in the 
intermediation process that helps solve problems that 
inhibit information transfer. As was noted previously, it 
is often difficult or even impossible for lenders to 
distinguish good information from bad information regarding 
borrowing firms. However, this problem may be resolved if 
the firms utilize a financial intermediary. Financial 
intermediaries are given access to information regarding the 
value of borrowing firms that is not made publicly 
available. A return from this information can occur only if 
buyers of intermediaries' claims believe that intermediaries 
use or produce reliable information about borrowing firms. 
This point becomes particularly critical when analyzing the 
capital market's response to various security offerings. If 
the market perceives that a particular type of intermediary 
has developed a reputation of producing more reliable 
information regarding borrowing firms relative to other 
intermediaries, then a greater excess return would be 
expected for borrowing firms that utilize that type of 
intermediary. For instance, high quality firms may utilize 
a reputable financial intermediary for their financing needs 
in order to provide a signal to the market of their true 
value, thus helping to reduce information asymmetries. 
Campbell (1979) suggests that another reason for the 
existence of financial intermediaries in capital markets is 
that intermediaries protect confidential information 
16 
regarding borrowing firms. The value of information 
possessed by borrowing firms is conditional upon the 
information remaining confidential. For example, if 
information regarding a technological process or marketing 
strategy inherent in the firm's production process is 
revealed to the public, the firm could lose its competitive 
advantage. As a result, firm value would be diminished. If 
managers act in the best interest of the owners of the firm, 
then they will seek financing sources that will protect the 
confidentiality of information pertaining to their firm and 
preserve profits for the current owners of the firm. 
Several obstacles must be overcome for a financing 
strategy to be effective in protecting the interests of the 
current owners of the firm. The current owners of the firm 
must be assured that the financing source will not use the 
private information to take advantage of the current owners. 
Therefore, the owners of the firm must be assured that the 
private information will remain confidential. Financial 
intermediaries may be used to overcome this obstacle. 
Financial intermediaries are given access to private 
information regarding borrowing firms. Since intermediaries 
provide financing for many types of borrowing firms and earn 
a return based upon the reputation that they have developed 
over time, they have an incentive to protect confidential 
information, otherwise borrowing firms would go elsewhere 
for their financing needs. Another obstacle that must be 
overcome is that the market must perceive that the recipient 
of the private information is in a position to verify its 
accuracy. As Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest, the market 
must perceive that the financial intermediary produces 
reliable information regarding the borrowing firm in order 
for the financial intermediary to provide credible signals 
regarding the future prospects of the borrowing firm. 
17 
Diamond (1984) has developed a theory of intermediation 
based upon the hypothesis that financial intermediaries 
minimize the cost of monitoring information regarding 
borrowing firms. In addition to information asymmetry 
problems, another disadvantage associated with direct 
lending with borrowing firms is that it is costly for an 
individual lender to monitor the activities of a borrowing 
firm. Considerable resources would be expended for the 
lender to individually monitor the borrower's activities in 
order to determine whether the firm is in compliance with 
the requirements of the loan agreement~ The cost of 
monitoring becomes particularly high when firms utilize 
several lenders for their financing needs where all lenders 
spend resources monitoring the firm and each lender holds 
only a small portion of the firm's total debt outstanding, 
resulting in duplication of monitoring activities. 
An associated problem when raising capital using 
several lenders is the free rider problem. The free rider 
problem occurs when one lender spends resources monitoring 
the activities of the borrowing firm, while other 
participating lenders receive the benefits of this lender's 
18 
monitoring without incurring the associated costs. Since 
the lender monitoring the borrowing firm is not receiving 
all of the benefits resulting from monitoring, he will not 
have an incentive to continue expending resources monitoring 
the borrowing firm. The ultimate result of the free rider 
problem is that no lender monitors the borrowing firm, 
resulting in inefficient information transfer and continued 
asymmetric information problems. 
One possible solution to these problems would be for 
one type of lender to monitor the activities of the 
borrowing firm on behalf of other lenders. However, this 
delegated monitoring activity gives rise to incentive 
problems, which Diamond (1984) defines as delegation costs. 
For a lender to perform this delegated monitoring role, 
there must be a cost advantage associated with this 
activity. Diamond (1984) goes on to suggest that financial 
intermediaries have that cost advantage in performing 
delegated monitoring activity. Financial intermediaries 
raise funds from many customers and promise customers a 
given pattern of returns or benefits, depending on the type 
of financial intermediary utilized. Financial 
intermediaries lend funds to borrowers and spend resources 
monitoring the activities of borrowing firms in order to 
protect their customer's interests. These intermediaries 
take full responsibility and bear all penalties associated 
with any short-fall of payments or benefits to their 
customers. He suggests that diversification within the 
financial intermediary's loan portfolio reduces the 
probability of incurring these penalties and provides the 
necessary incentives for the intermediary to provide 
delegated monitoring activities. 
19 
Diamond (1991) provides further evidence regarding the 
monitoring role of lenders in security offerings. Directly 
placed debt, such as commercial paper, and public debt 
offerings contain covenants and other loan provisions that 
are based only upon publicly available information. During 
the credit evaluation process, financial intermediaries 
utilize this publicly available information as well as 
private information obtained from costly monitoring of the 
borrowing firm's activities in order to decide whether to 
provide financing. Diamond (1991) suggests that a 
borrower's reputation acquired when monitored by a financial 
intermediary, such as a bank, helps to predict the future 
actions of borrowers when not monitored, such as when the 
borrowing firm issues public debt or commercial paper. The 
bank lending process helps to screen out some borrowers who 
are caught taking actions that are in their self-interest. 
This result indicates that financial intermediaries, such as 
banks, that are given access to private information and also 
provide monitoring activities reduce moral hazard problems 
associated with security offerings. 
The costs associated with financial intermediation has 
not been examined in the literature to the same extent as 
the benefits. Rajan (1992) distinguishes between financing 
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sources by their ability to acquire information about the 
borrowing firm. He refers to bank loans as informed debt 
since the bank is given access to information during the 
lending process that is not necessarily publicly available. 
However, lenders in arms-length debt, such as public debt 
offerings, utilize only publicly available information. 
Rajan (1992) suggests that there is a trade-off between the 
benefits of short-term informed debt, long-term informed 
debt, and arm's length public debt. Although 
short-term informed debt, such as bank loans, provide 
flexible financing to borrowing firms, the cost of this 
financing is that banks can affect the borrowing firm's 
decisions during the maturity of the loan. If borrowing 
firms utilize short-term informed debt for their financing 
needs, then the lender can have bargaining power over the 
firm's profits when the loan is renewed. In some instances, 
lenders may choose not to renew the loan at maturity unless 
the borrowing firm agrees to share part of the surplus 
resulting from the project with the lender. If the firm no 
longer receives all the surplus from the project, they exert 
lower effort than optimal, thus reducing the project's 
returns. Borrowing firms that need long-term financing may 
have an incentive to utilize long-term arm's length debt 
rather than continually renewing short-term bank loans in 
order to avoid the above costs associated with banks loans. 
Rajan (1992) suggests that both the benefits and costs 
associated with short-term informed debt is applicable to 
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long-term informed debt if the lender has an exogenous 
source of power over the borrowing firm. An example of this 
power would be lenders which have the ability to purchase 
shares of the borrowing firm's common stock. The lender can 
affect the borrowing firm's decisions during the maturity of 
the loan through the lender's voting rights, regardless of 
whether the debt is short-term or long-term, thus providing 
the managers of the borrowing firm with an incentive to 
devote the effort necessary to achieve optimal results. In 
this situation, the lender's ability to purchase stock 
provides them with recourse similar to the renewal process 
associated with short term informed debt. 
Empirical Studies 
Thus far, three primary reasons have been examined 
regarding the existence of financial intermediaries in 
capital markets: (1) financial intermediaries produce 
reliable information regarding borrowing firms, thereby 
helping to reduce information asymmetries; (2) financial 
intermediaries help protect the confidentiality of 
information regarding borrowing firms; and (3) financial 
intermediaries provide a valuable monitoring role in capital 
markets, although the cost is that financial intermediaries 
can affect decision making during the term of the loan. In 
order to further analyze the benefits associated with 
financial intermediation, it would be useful to examine the 
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capital market's response to borrowing firms which utilize 
financial intermediaries for their financing needs. Summary 
statistics noted in previous empirical studies regarding the 
stock price response associated with public security 
offerings, bank loans, commercial paper offerings, and 
private placements are presented in Table I and Table II 
respectively. 
Empirical Studies: Public Offerings 
Studies which have examined the wealth impact of public 
security offerings include Mikkelson and Partch (1986), 
Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), Eckbo 
(1986), and Dann and Mikkelson (1984). In each of these 
studies standard event study methodology was utilized in 
order to measure the market's response to announcements of 
various types of security offerings. Three generalizations 
can be drawn from these studies regarding the relative 
impact of public security offerings on firm value: (1) the 
average abnormal returns for public offerings of all types 
of securities are non-positive; (2) abnormal returns 
associated with common stock offerings are negative and 
larger in value than those observed for preferred stock or 
debt; (3) abnormal returns for announcements of convertible 
offerings are negative and larger in absolute value than 
those for corresponding non-convertible securities. 
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One possible explanation for the negative stock price 
response associated with public offerings of securities is 
information asymmetries associated with the public market. 
This would be consistent with theoretical models developed 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985) which 
predict negative stock price reactions associated with 
public offerings (i.e., external financing decisions). 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that managers will utilize 
external financing sources only when they believe the firm's 
securities are overpriced in relation to their true value, 
whereas Miller and Rock (1985) suggest that any unexpected 
external financing decision indicates the firm has less-
than-expected internal financing sources. Consequently, 
these studies suggest that investors infer negative 
information about the future prospects of the borrowing firm 
as a result of the public offering. 
Empirical Studies: Bank Loans 
To further understand the benefits associated with 
intermediation, researchers have examined the stock price 
response associated with announcements of bank lending 
agreements. Banks are financial intermediaries which accept 
funds from depositors, loan funds to borrowers, and monitor 
the activities of the borrowing firms in order to determine 
TABLE I 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
I. 
Author 
Public Offerings 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
Masulis and Kowar (1986) 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) 
Eckbo (1986) 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
Dan and Mikkelson (1984) 
Eckbo (1986) 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
Dan and Mikkelson (1984) 
II. Public Utility Offeringsb 
Masulis and Kowar (1986) 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) 
Eckbo (1986) 
Type of Issue 
Equity 
Equity 
Equity 
Debt 
Debt 
Debt 
Convertible Debt 
Convertible Debt 
Convertible Debt 
Equity 
Equity 
Equity 
Sample Sample 
Size Period 
47 
388 
128 
459 
111 
150 
75 
23 
132 
584 
264 
86 
1972-82 
1963-80 
1963-81 
1964-81 
1972-82 
1970-79 
1964-81 
1972-82 
1970-79 
1963-80 
1963-81 
1964-81 
APEa 
-4.36 
-3.25 
-3.00 
-0.06 
0.06 
-0.37 
-1. 25 
-1. 39 
-2.31 
-0.68 
-0.90 
-0.50 
z-statistic 
(t-statistic) 
-9.43 C 
(-11. 27) C 
(-12.50)c 
-0.44 
0.57 
(-1.76)c 
-4.60 C 
-3.19 C 
(-7.70)c 
-24.20 C 
(-7.80)c 
-2.20 d 
~The abnormal return is calculated for the window (-1,0) unless otherwise specified. 
According to Smith (1986), virtually no convertible bonds are issued by utilities. 
~Significant at the .01 level. 
Significant at the .05 level. 
eSignificant at the .10 level. l's) .i:,. 
TABLE II 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR BANK LOANS, COMMERCIAL PAPER OFFERINGS AND PRIVATE PLACEMENT 
Sample Sample z-statistic 
Author Type of Issue Size Period APEa (t-statistic) 
I. Bank Loans d Lummer and McConnell (1989) Loans 728 1976-86 0.61 2.69d 
James (1987) Loans 80 1974-83 1. 93 3.96 
II. Commercial Paper Offerings 
2.36d Slovin et al. (1988) NIF 35 1982-85 1. 39 
Slovin et al. (1988) Non-NIF 73 1982-85 0.12 0.40 
III. Private Placements 
Wruck (1989) Equity 99 1979-85 1. 89 1. 91e 
James (1987) Debt 37 1974-83 -0.91 -1. 87 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) Debt 57 1972-82 -0.36 
-0.57d 
Fields and Mais (1991) Convertible Debt 61 1970-87 1. 80 2.20 
IV. Private Placements by Utilities 
Szewczyk and Varma {1991) Debt 293 1963-86 0.539 3.04c 
~The abnormal return is calculated for the window (-1,0) unless otherwise specified. 
Wruck (1989) found an excess return of 4.41% for the window (-3,0). 
~Significant at the .01 level. 
Significant at the .05 level. 
:significant at the .10 level. 
Szewczyk and Varma excess return was calculated for the window (-2,+2). l'v u, 
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that borrowers are in compliance .with the requirements of a 
loan agreement. Banks also are given access to private 
information about borrowing firms that is not otherwise made 
publicly available and then make loan decisions based upon 
this private information. Therefore, banks can be seen as 
evaluating the borrowing firm's securities based upon 
private information. Banks also have an incentive to 
protect confidential information regarding borrowing firms. 
Since banks provide funds to many different borrowing firms 
and have the opportunity for repeat business, banks have 
reputational capital at stake. Therefore, banks provide the 
benefits of producing reliable information about borrowing 
firms, protecting confidential information, and providing 
valuable monitoring services. 
If the capital market perceives that bank loans help 
reduce information asymmetries associated with public 
offerings of debt, one would expect a positive stock price 
response to be associated with announcements of bank loans. 
James (1987) examined the stock price response associated 
with announcements of bank loans and public offerings of 
debt utilizing standard event study methodology. He found a 
significantly positive excess return associated with 
announcements of bank loans. In contrast, a non-positive 
stock price response was found to be associated with 
announcements of public offerings of debt. 
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The positive stock price response associated with 
announcements of bank loans provides testable implications 
regarding the benefits associated with financial 
intermediation. For instance, if the positive excess return 
associated with bank loans is a result of decisions based 
upon private information, one would expect a similar 
response to be associated with other types of debt offerings 
where the lender is given access to private information 
regarding the borrowing firm. However, James (1987) found a 
negative excess return associated with announcements of 
private placements of debt. These results are similar to 
the findings of Mikkelson and Partch (1986) regarding 
private placements of debt. James (1987) also examined the 
hypothesis that the difference in the excess return among 
announcements of bank loans, private placements of debt and 
straight debt offerings arise because the debt offerings 
differ systematically in some important feature that is 
unrelated to the lender, such as the risk of the issue, the 
size of the debt issue or the maturity of the issue. 
However, using event study methodology and cross-sectional 
regression analysis he found that the stock price response 
associated with bank loans, private placements, and public 
debt issues were unrelated to these factors. Based upon 
this, James (1987) concludes that banks provide some special 
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service associated with their lending activity that is not 
available from other lenders. In other words, bank loans 
are unique. This conclusion relies much on the work of Fama 
(1985) who also suggests that banks play a unique role in 
providing funds to borrowing firms. 
In addition to decisions based upon private 
information, Fama (1985) states that the credibility of the 
signal associated with bank decisions is particularly 
enhanced given the short-term nature of bank loans. Bank 
loans typically have shorter maturities than other financing 
sources (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; and James, 1987). 
Borrowing firms which utilize short-term bank loans for 
their financing needs subject themselves to periodic review 
and evaluation when loans are renewed. Therefore the 
decision by the borrowing firm to use bank financing 
reflects a choice by the firm to utilize a reputable 
outsider, such as a bank, to periodically monitor their 
activities. Fama (1985) also suggests that bank loans are 
useful to avoid duplication of information costs incurred by 
other creditors of the firm. Given the periodic review 
process associated with short term bank loans, positive 
renewal signals from bank loans indicate that other 
creditors of the firm do not need to undertake similar 
costly evaluations of the borrowing firm, thereby avoiding 
duplication of monitoring costs. 
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It should be noted that the Fama (1985) argument 
regarding the uniqueness of bank loans places considerable 
emphasis on the loan renewal process as a mechanism for 
transmitting information in capital markets. In a related 
context, Lummer and McConnell (1989) suggest that loan 
renewals provide information regarding the borrowing firm to 
the capital market. Given the short-term nature of bank 
loans, borrowing firms which utilize banks for their 
financing needs must submit themselves to periodic review in 
order to renew credit agreements. According to Lummer and 
McConnell (1989), banks have an information advantage over 
other capital market participants as a result of a continued 
working relationship with the borrowing firm. In other 
words, banks produce reliable information regarding 
borrowing firms as a natural outgrowth of their business 
relationship, which is developed over time. Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) suggest that if there is a positive stock 
price response associated with bank loans, it should occur 
at the announcement of revisions to existing bank loans 
rather than at the initiation of a new bank loan agreement. 
In order to test the hypothesis that loan renewals 
provide information to the capital market, Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) examined the stock price response 
associated with announcements of new bank loans and 
announcements of loan renewals. By making this distinction, 
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they hope to provide evidence as to whether banks have an 
information advantage at the outset of the credit agreement 
or whether this advantage develops over time as the result 
of a continuing working relationship with the borrowing 
firm. They found a positive excess return associated with 
announcements of revisions to existing credit agreements, 
where the terms of the credit agreement were revised 
favorably. However, they found that announcements of new 
credit agreements resulted in an excess return that was not 
significantly different from zero. Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) conclude that decisions by banks send a credible 
signal to the market as a result of a continuing working 
relationship with borrowing firms, which is developed over 
time. This result indicates that the loan renewal process 
is a credible mechanism for signalling the credit worthiness 
of firms which utilize banks for their financing needs. 
In a related context, Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1988) 
examined the role of bank participation in commercial paper 
programs. Most commercial paper issuers obtain a line of 
credit from a bank which provides the firm with an 
alternative source of liquidity in the event that the 
commercial paper market becomes unavailable. These lines of 
credit are usually revocable and allow the bank to withdraw 
from its commitment if the situation warrants. In some 
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instances, commercial paper issues are backed by irrevocable 
standby letters of credit or note issuance facilities in 
which the bank guarantees the funds to the security holder 
even if the issuer enters into bankruptcy. In effect, the 
credit risk of the issuer is assumed by the bank and the 
bank can be viewed as the ultimate guarantor for the issue. 
Slevin, Sushka, and Hudson (1988) found that 
announcements of commercial paper programs with irrevocable 
standby letters of credit or note issuance facilities result 
in a significantly positive stock price response. However, 
the wealth impact associated with other types of commercial 
paper issues without this type of backing is not 
significant. They suggest that the bank's credibility and 
reputation provides a quality certification service for 
commercial paper issues backed by irrevocable standby 
letters of credit or note issuance facilities. The 
commercial paper issuer pays the bank for this service and 
provides the bank with private information that is not 
available to other market participants so that the bank may 
adequately provide this certification service. Therefore, 
commercial paper issues backed by irrevocable standby 
letters of credit or note issuance facilities indicates that 
the bank, after evaluating the private information provided 
by the borrowing firm, is willing to risk its reputational 
capital, thus sending a positive signal to the market. 
32 
In summary, studies have shown that a positive stock 
price response is associated with announcements of bank 
loans and bank participation in commercial paper offerings, 
whereas there is a negative response associated with public 
offerings of securities. These results provide support for 
the hypothesis that financial intermediaries, such as banks, 
help reduce information asymmetries associated with public 
offerings. If this benefit is the result of factors 
inherent in the intermediation process, such as decision by 
financial intermediaries based upon private information or 
increased monitoring activities, one would expect a similar 
positive response to be associated with other types of 
security offerings where intermediaries are given access to 
private information and/or perform monitoring activities. 
Empirical Studies: Investment Bankers 
Investment banking firms generate substantial amounts 
of revenue underwriting many different types of securities 
issuances with various types of borrowing firms. As a 
result, investment bankers develop a reputation over time 
and earn a return based upon their reputation. Since an 
investment banker has reputational capital at stake, an 
investment banker that does not protect confidential 
information or produces unreliable information will lose 
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customers (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Not only is there an 
incentive for investment bankers to maintain confidential 
information, there is also an incentive for them to produce 
reliable information regarding borrowing firms. 
Booth and Smith (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), and 
Hughes (1986) propose that investment bankers also help to 
reduce information asymmetries associated with security 
offerings. As a part of the underwriting process investment 
bankers are given access to private information regarding 
the borrowing firm that is not otherwise made publicly 
available. Since investment bankers have an incentive to 
produce reliable information, investment bankers help 
certify that the issue price is consistent with private 
information, thus helping to reduce information asymmetries. 
Therefore, investment bankers can be seen as providing a 
valuable certification role in capital markets. 
In a related context, Slevin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) 
provide empirical support regarding the impact of 
underwriter certification on firm value. They suggest that 
the more valuable the reputation of the investment banker, 
the greater the value of the certification service they 
provide. In other words, more prestigious investment 
bankers provide more valuable underwriting services relative 
to other investment bankers. Previous studies, such as 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Masulis and Kowar (1986), 
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have shown a significantly negative excess return to be 
associated with public offerings of equity. However, 
Slovin, Sushka and Hudson (1990) suggest that utilization of 
more prestigious investment bankers may result in a less 
negative stock price reaction to the announcement of a 
seasoned equity offering. 
Slovin, Sushka and Hudson (1990) partitioned their 
sample into four categories: (1) firms which utilized a 
special category underwriter, which includes the most 
prestigious investment banking firms, (2) borrowers which 
utilized national underwriters, (3) firms which used a 
regional investment banking firms, and (4) the investment 
banking firm utilized was a local underwriter. The Special 
category is based upon the fact that within the investment 
banking industry a small set of prestigious firms dominate 
the industry (Hayes, 1979). Six firms which underwrite over 
two thirds of all equity issues comprise the Special 
category: Salomon Brothers, Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co., 
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Shearson Lehman, and First 
Boston Corp. They found that announcements by borrowing 
firms which employed one of these six firms to underwrite 
the offering resulted in a significantly less negative 
stock price responses than announcements made by firms which 
utilized the other investment banker categories. 
These results were further supported by regression 
analysis. Excess returns were regressed on dummy variables 
representing the prestjge of the investment banker. The 
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coefficient on the dummy variable for the special category 
was found to be the most significant. The pattern of the 
coefficients for each category supports the hypothesis that 
underwriters with less prestigious reputations result in a 
more negative excess return. Therefore, Slovin, Sushka, and 
Hudson (1990) conclude that more prestigious investment 
bankers provide more valuable. certification services. 
Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) suggest that in addition 
to certification services, investment banking firms also 
monitor borrowing firms. Monitoring in this context is 
defined as investigating the borrowing firms in order to 
provide information about managerial effort and the firm's 
internal assessment mechanisms. Easterbrook (1984) suggests 
that investment bankers which monitor borrowing firms on the 
behalf of stockholders increase firm value because 
monitoring by an investment banker overcomes the free-rider 
problem associated with monitoring by individual 
stockholders. As discussed previously, investment bankers 
have reputational capital at stake when certifying that the 
issue price is consistent with public and private 
information. The monitoring role of investment bankers, 
which also puts the reputation of the investment banker at 
risk, involves investigating the borrowing firm with the 
purpose of improving performance, which in turn raises the 
stock price. Therefore, Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) argue 
that investment banking firms provide valuable monitoring 
and certification services associated with security issues. 
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Privately Placed Securities 
As an alternative to public offerings of securities or 
bank loans, firms may utilize a private placement offering 
for their financing needs. A private placement of debt 
usually involves the sale of securities to a single or small 
group of financial intermediaries, such as insurance 
companies, pension funds and financial firms. Privately 
placed securities are exempt from the registration and 
disclosure requirements associated with public security 
offerings. Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 
permits the unregistered sale of securities to a limited 
number of "sophisticated" lenders. The assumption here is 
that "sophisticated" lenders have the capacity to thoroughly 
investigate the merits of the security issue without 
monitoring by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The private placement market experienced tremendous 
growth during the 1980's. Table III presents descriptive 
statistics regarding the growth of the private placement 
market. Total private placements grew rapidly from $15.7 
billion in 1980 to $165.4 billion in 1989 for an annualized 
yearly growth rate of 22.6%. Debt issues comprised the 
largest percentage of total privately placed securities 
(over 85% on average). Thus, the tremendous growth in this 
market is largely attributable to the growth of private 
placements of debt. 
There are several reasons noted in the literature for 
the rapid growth of the private placement market. Private 
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TABLE III 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT 
Private Percentage Percentage 
Placements of Total Debt of Total 
Year (Billions) Financing Placements 
1980 $ 15.7 22 88 
1981 18.4 25 87 
1982 24.3 28 85 
1983 35.6 27 81 
1984 53.2 39 82 
1985 73.1 35 83 
1986 123.5 30 90 
1987 139.4 34 88 
1988 145.1 37 85 
1989 165.4 35 82 
1990 120.6 28 86 
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placement are less costly and can be completed in a shorter 
time period than corresponding public issues. The rapid 
growth of leveraged buyouts (LBO's), the use of junk bond 
financing, and the tremendous growth in the number of 
mergers during the 1980's also contributed to the growth of 
the private placement market (Maher and Sommar, 1990). A 
more detailed comparison of the similarities and differences 
between private placements, bank loans, and public debt 
offerings is provided in the next section. In addition, the 
role of investment bankers in both public offerings and 
private placements will be examined. 
Comparison of Public and Private Offerings 
Private placements of debt take significantly less time 
to complete and have lower floatation costs relative to 
public offerings of debt. Borrowing firms obtain funds more 
quickly through private placements of debt because 
registration of the issue is not required by the SEC. This 
also contributes to lower floatation costs in private 
placements of debt. In a public debt offering, the 
borrowing firm must pay legal and printing fees associated 
with SEC registration. 
Investment bankers perform different roles in private 
placements of debt and public debt offerings which further 
contributes to higher floatation costs associated with 
public debt issues. In a public offering, the investment 
banker provides a variety of origination services, such as 
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preparation of the prospectus, preselling activities 
associated with demand estimates, and advice regarding the 
structure of the issue. The investment banker usually 
performs an underwriting function in public offerings, where 
the investment banker or its syndicate purchases the 
security issue from the borrowing firm. The investment 
banker then distributes the securities to investors, 
hopefully at a price greater than it cost the investment 
banker to purchase the new issue from the borrowing firm. 
As a result, the investment banker assumes the risk of 
selling the security at a higher price. However, investment 
bankers in private placements of debt do not underwrite the 
issue. The investment banker serves as a broker in the 
private placement process bringing borrowing firms and 
prospective lenders together (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988). 
The investment banker may also provide advice regarding the 
structure of the issue and comparative conditions in the 
private placement process. However, many borrowing firms do 
not utilize an investment banker during the private 
placement process, but work directly with potential 
investors. As a result of these factors, floatation costs 
in private placements of debt are minimal in comparison to 
public debt offerings. 
Booth and Smith (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), and 
Hughes (1986) suggest that investment bankers have developed 
a reputation associated with the services they provide in 
security offerings and earn a return based upon this 
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reputation. Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) found that 
the more prestigious the reputation of the investment 
banker, the more valuable the services they provide. 
Although investment bankers perform different roles in 
private placements and public debt offerings, the market may 
perceive investment bankers to be providing monitoring and 
certification services in private placements similar to 
those associated with public offerings. Therefore, we would 
also expect the more prestigious the reputation of the 
investment banker the more valuable the services they 
provide in private placements of debt. 
In a public offering of debt, financial information 
about the borrowing firm is su.bmi tted to the SEC and is a 
matter of public record. Since private placements of debt 
are exempt from the registration and disclosure requirements 
of the SEC, information about the financial prospects of the 
borrowing firm are not necessarily made publicly available. 
However, during the private placement process, lenders 
utilize publically available information and private 
information supplied by the borrowing firm in order to 
evaluate the credit worthiness of the borrowing firm. 
Lenders in private placements of debt can be seen as 
evaluating the borrowing firm based upon private 
information. In a related context, private placements offer 
the borrowing firm financial flexibility since the terms of 
the issue may be tailored to meet their specific needs. For 
example firms do not necessarily have to take the approved 
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funds all at once. Borrowing firms can pay a commitment fee 
to the lender and "draw down" against the approved funds as 
needed (Martin, Petty, Keown, and Scott, 1991). This 
provides financial flexibility, because the firm does not 
have to borrow the funds if the need does not arise. 
Private placements of debt often have more restrictive 
covenants than public debt offerings (Smith and Warner, 
1979). As was discussed above, during the process of 
negotiating the private placements of debt, lenders are 
given access to information that is not necessarily publicly 
available. Covenants can thus be written that address 
special concerns of lenders. Renegotiation provisions are 
also more frequently included and exercised in private 
placements than in public debt issues (Smith and Warner, 
1979). If a borrowing firm wants to change specific 
covenants associated with a public debt offering, typically 
two-thirds of the holders of the principal amount of the 
debt issue must approve the covenant modification. In 
addition, changes to the maturity or the principal amount of 
the debt issue requires the approval of 100% of the holders 
of the debt issue. Although modifications of the terms in 
private placements of debt also requires 100% lender 
approval, there are fewer participating lenders in private 
placements of debt. Approval of changes pertaining to the 
terms of the issue or covenant stipulations requires 
negotiations with a smaller group of lenders and is much 
easier to obtain. Zinberg (1975) reports that unless there 
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is some material change in the risk or financial position of 
borrowing firms, lenders in private placements of debt 
typically approve modifications to covenant provisions 
requested by borrowing firms. 
Comparison of Bank Loans and Insurance 
Companies as Lenders 
Another alternative to private placements of debt are 
bank loans. Banks are financial intermediaries that accept 
funds from depositors, loan funds to borrowers, and monitor 
the activities of the borrowers during the loan. James 
(1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) suggest that banks 
have developed a reputation of providing effective lending 
decisions which the market views as a signal of the credit 
worthiness of the borrowing firm. Insurance companies are 
the primary lenders in private placements of debt. Maher 
(1989) suggests that insurance companies have developed a 
reputation of being experts at credit evaluation in the 
private placement market. Insurance companies are financial 
intermediaries which use the premiums paid by customers to 
invest in assets such as stocks and bonds. Insurance 
companies then use the earnings from these assets to pay out 
claims on their customers' policies. 
Banks utilize both publicly available information and 
private information in order to determine the credit 
worthiness of borrowing firms. Completion of the bank 
financing agreement indicates the bank's willingness to risk 
43 
reputational capital by lending to the borrowing firm. 
Announcements of bank loans can be viewed by the market as a 
signal which helps alleviate information asymmetries which 
exist regarding the future prospects of the borrowing firm. 
During the private placement process, insurance companies 
are given access to information about borrowing firms that 
is not necessarily made publicly available. As a result, 
insurance companies evaluate the firm on the basis of 
private information. Insurance companies, as lenders in 
private placements, perform a quality certification service 
from which other market participants may infer positive 
information about the borrowing firm's prospects. 
Banks provide monitoring of the borrowing firm's 
activities which helps to reduce agency costs. Diamond 
(1984) suggests that monitoring of private information is 
most efficiently delegated to financial intermediaries, 
rather than being collected by individual investors. 
Otherwise, there is duplication of monitoring costs or, 
alternatively, the free rider problem. Banks utilize both 
public and private information during the credit evaluation 
process in order to condition loan covenants. Banks provide 
delegated monitoring of the activities of the borrowing firm 
during the life of the loan. 
We hypothesize that in private placements of debt, 
insurance companies, acting as a delegated monitor, also 
provide valuable monitoring of the borrowing firm's 
activities. Insurance companies are given access to private 
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information about the borrowing firm during the personal 
negotiating process associated with private placements of 
debt, and then condition the covenants of the debt issue on 
the basis of this private information. Insurance companies 
then monitor the activities of the borrowing firm throughout 
the life of the debt contract. 
In general, bank loans typically have shorter 
maturities than private placements of debt. Given the 
short~term nature of bank loans, borrowing firms which 
utilize banks for their financing needs subject themselves 
to periodic review and evaluations when loans are renewed. 
Banks are given access to private information about 
borrowing firms over time as a result of the loan renewal 
process and through the bank's monitoring of the borrowing 
firm's activities. Renewals to short-term bank loans 
indicate a bank's willingness to continue providing funds 
and to continue risking reputational capital, sending a 
positive signal to the capital market. 
Insurance companies are also given access to private 
information about borrowing firms over time, however, 
private placements are generally not renewed. Although 
insurance companies do not have the same degree of recourse 
as banks, they do have some recourse over the life of the 
debt contract. Since private placements have restrictive 
covenants, modification to existing covenants must be 
approved by the lender, thus providing insurance companies 
with some recourse. Insurance companies have the potential 
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to purchase shares of conunon stock in the borrowing firm 
utilizing their voting rights attached to the conunon stock 
to affect the firm's decision making during the term of the 
debt contract. Rajan (1992) suggests that equity ownership 
can provide recourse similar to the renewal process 
associated with short-term bank loans. 
To sununarize, there are many similarities between the 
bank lending process and insurance companies as lenders in 
private placements of debt. Banks have developed a 
reputation of providing effective quality certification and 
monitoring services associated with their lending 
activities. Maher (1989) suggests insurance companies have 
developed a reputation of being experts at credit evaluation 
in the private placement debt market. Insurance companies 
evaluate the borrowing firm on the basis of private 
information and monitor the activities of the firm 
throughout the life of the bond contract. Given the short-
term nature of bank loans, the renewal process provides 
banks with recourse. In a similar manner, the ability of 
insurance companies to purchase conunon stock of the firm and 
approve modifications to restrictive covenants provides them 
with a similar mechanism of recourse in private placements. 
James (1987) and Lununer and McConnell (1989) found a 
positive stock price response for announcements of new bank 
loans and renewals to existing bank loans respectively. 
These studies suggest that the benefits associated with bank 
lending provides positive information to the market about 
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the borrowing firm. We hypothesize that the market views an 
insurance company in a private placement of debt to be 
performing the same functions as a bank in the bank lending 
process such that we would expect a positive stock price 
response to be associated with announcements of private 
placements of debt where the lender is an insurance company. 
Empirical Studies: Private Placements 
The capital market response associated with 
announcements of private offerings have not been examined in 
the literature to the same extent as public offerings. 
However, several studies have focused on the wealth impact 
of announcements of private placements of various types of 
security issuances. The results of these studies are in 
sharp contrast to the findings of previous studies regarding 
public offerings of the same type of security. 
The stock price response associated with announcements 
of private placements of equity was examined by Wruck 
(1989). In a private placement of equity, the firm sells a 
block of equity to a select group of investors. In most 
cases, fewer than five investors are involved in the private 
equity offering. She found a significantly positive excess 
return associated with private placements of equity. This 
is in sharp contrast to the negative excess return for 
public equity offerings found by Masulis and Korwar (1986), 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986), and Asquith and Mullins (1986). 
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Wruck (1989) suggests that the positive response 
associated with private equity offerings is a result of 
reduced information asymmetries. Given the personal 
negotiating process involved in private placements of 
equity, Wruck (1989) suggests that managers can more 
effectively convey private information to individual buyers 
regarding the future prospects of the firm. Consequently 
purchasers of the firm's equity provide a quality 
certification service, thus providing positive information 
to the market about the borrowing firm. 
Wruck (1989) also suggests that there is a positive 
relationship between the excess return associated with 
private equity offerings and the change in ownership 
concentration resulting from the equity offering. Private 
equity offerings establish new equity blockholders resulting 
in a shift in ownership concentration. The impact of the 
change in ownership concentration depends on the market's 
perception of the effect the change will have on firm value. 
If the change in ownership concentration is expected to more 
closely align manager and shareholder interests, a positive 
response would be expected to be associated with the private 
equity offering (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Utilizing cross sectional regression analysis, the 
relationship between the excess return associated with 
private equity offerings and changes in ownership 
concentration was examined (where ownership concentration 
was defined as the percentage holdings of the largest 
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shareholders as reported in proxy statements). She found 
that there was a significant positive relationship between 
the change in firm value and the change in ownership 
concentration resulting from the private equity offering. 
Therefore, Wruck (1989) concludes that increased ownership 
concentration resulting from private equity offerings has a 
positive impact on firm value. 
This result has implications regarding increased 
monitoring resulting from private placements of equity. As 
was noted above, changes in ownership concentration creates 
new blockholders of the firm's securities. Large 
blockholders have a greater incentive to engage in 
monitoring activities because their proportional claim on 
any resulting increase in firm value may outweigh the costs 
they incur monitoring. The positive stock price response 
associated with private placements of equity could be a 
result of increased monitoring by large blockholders. 
Fields and Mais (1991) examined the stock price 
response resulting from announcements of private placements 
of convertible debt. As noted by Wruck (1989), private 
placements of equity often result in the creation of outside 
blockholders who have an incentive to perform monitoring 
activities. In a related context, Fields and Mais (1991) 
suggest that private placements of convertible debt may 
result in increased monitoring since upon conversion 
blockholders can use their voting rights to influence the 
management of the borrowing firm. Through the personal 
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negotiating process associated with the private placement 
market, lenders participating in private placements of 
convertible debt are given access to information regarding 
borrowing firms that is not necessarily made available to 
public security holders, thus helping to reduce information 
asymmetries. 
They found a positive, statistically significant stock 
price response associated with announcements of private 
placements of convertible debt. This is in sharp contrast 
to the negative response associated with public issues of 
convertible debt noted by Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Eckbo 
(1986) and Dann and Mikkelson (1984). These results suggest 
that private placements of convertible debt convey positive 
information regarding the borrowing firm to the capital 
market. Through regression analysis, Fields and Mais (1991) 
found that there was a significantly positive relationship 
between the stock price response associated with private 
placements of convertible debt and the relative size of the 
issue (issue size/market value of equity). Since private 
placements are typically to a small group of "sophisticated" 
investors, Fields and Mais (1991) argue that these results 
provide support for the hypothesis that private placements 
of convertible debt provides positive information to the 
market about the firm. The positive relationship between 
the relative size of the issue and the excess return 
indicates that the firm's ability to place a relatively 
large convertible debt issue may convey more favorable 
information to the market, since larger debt issues result 
in a large block of new shareholders created upon 
conversion. 
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Szewczyk and Varma (1991) examined the capital market's 
response to announcements of private placements of debt 
where the borrowing firm was a public utility company. They 
suggest that investors infer positive information regarding 
the borrowing firm from the completion of a private 
placement of debt for the following reasons: 
(1) information asymmetries are reduced as a result of the 
personal negotiating process involved in the private 
placement agreement; (2) lenders in the private placement 
market provide a quality certification role demonstrated by 
their willingness to purchase the firm's securities, and 
(3) through the establishment of blockholders, private 
placements result in a closer monitoring of the firm. 
They found a significantly positive excess return 
associated with announcements of private placements of 
public utility debt, which is in sharp contrast to the 
negative stock price response associated with public 
offerings of debt where the borrowing firm was a public 
utility found by Eckbo (1986). These results provide 
support for the argument that investors infer positive 
information as a result of the completion of the private 
placement of debt. Through regression analysis, Szewczyk 
and Varma (1991) found a significantly positive relationship 
between the excess return associated with announcements of 
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private placements of debt and the relative size of the debt 
issue. They suggest that the ability of a firm to privately 
place a relatively large debt issue may provide a positive 
signal to the extent that it reflects a willingness of 
lenders to make a larger commitment of funds. 
Extending the results of Szewczyk and Varma (1991) for 
private placements of debt by utilities to private 
placements for all types of borrowing firms may be 
problematic. Utilities are regulated, whereas industrial 
firms are not. Regulation may help reduce information 
asymmetries associated with security offerings by utilities. 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Kowar (1986) 
found that the excess returns associated with security 
issues by industrial firms are more negative than those for 
utilities. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) 
found a non-positive response for announcements of private 
placements of debt for a random sample of industrial firms, 
but Szewczyk and Varma (1991) found a positive, 
statistically significant excess return for private 
placements of debt by utilities. These results suggest that 
regulation rather than the certification and monitoring role 
of lenders may help reduce information asymmetries for 
security offerings by utility or financial borrowing firms. 
Hypotheses Statements 
Empirical studies document a non-positive stock price 
response associated with public debt offerings. One 
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possible explanation for this response is information 
asymmetries which exist in public security markets. 
Borrowing firms possess superior information regarding the 
true value of their firm's future earning prospects. 
Prospective investors would benefit from the knowledge of 
the true value of these projects, but dissemination of 
credible information in public security offerings is costly, 
particularly when there are numerous investors. In addition 
to information asymmetry problems, it is costly for lenders 
to monitor the borrowing firm. Considerable resources would 
be expended for numerous lenders in public debt offerings to 
individually monitor the firm's activities to determine 
compliance with the terms of the financing agreement. 
James (1987) found that announcements of banks loans 
result in a favorable stock price response. He suggests 
that borrowing firms which utilize bank loans for their 
financing needs provide positive information to the market 
as a results of the benefits associated with the bank 
lending process. Lummer and McConnell (1989) suggest that 
the loan renewal process associated with short-term bank 
loans is a reliable mechanism for signalling the credit 
worthiness of borrowing firms to the capital market. The 
results of these studies provides support for the following 
benefits associated with the bank lending process: 
(1) decisions based upon private information help to 
alleviate information asymmetries; (2) monitoring by a 
reputable lender helps to reduce agency costs; and (3) the 
short-term renewal process provides banks with recourse. 
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Previous studies which have examined the stock price 
response associated with announcements of private placements 
of debt have found mixed results. Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986) and James (1987) found a non-positive, insignificant 
stock response associated with announcements of private 
placements of debt made by industrial firms. However, the 
emphasis of these studies was on public offerings and bank 
loans respectively and they did not explore any 
cross-sectional variation in their sample of private 
placements. Szewczyk and Varma (1991) found a significant 
positive abnormal return associated with announcements of 
private placements of debt where the issuing firm was a 
public -utility. They suggest that borrowing firms may use 
private placements of debt to provide a positive signal 
about their true value. However, Asquith and Mullins (1986) 
and Masulis and Korwar (1986) suggest that utility 
regulation may help to reduce information asymmetries 
associated with utility security offerings, thereby 
resulting in a favorable stock price response. Utility 
regulation, rather than the benefits associated with private 
placements of debt, may mitigate information asymmetry 
problems associated with utility security offerings. 
We hypothesize that borrowing firms which place debt 
privately with insurance companies provide the market with a 
credible signal of their true value. Insurance companies, 
as lenders in private placements of debt, provide benefits 
similar to banks in the bank lending process. We argue that 
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insurance companies have developed a reputation of providing 
effective monitoring and certification services in the 
private placement market, similar to those associated with 
bank loans. Insurance companies also have recourse, much 
like the renewal process associated with short-term bank 
loans, through their ability to purchase the common stock of 
the borrowing firm and to approve modifications to 
restrictive covenants. Since insurance companies provide 
benefits similar to those associated with the bank lending 
process, we would expect a positive stock price response to 
be associated with private placements of debt where an 
insurance company is the lender. 
Before examining this hypothesis, we first want to 
determine the wealth impact associated with announcements of 
private placements of debt where the lender is specified. 
Identification of the lender in the private placement 
announcement may provide positive information about the 
value of the borrowing firm to the capital market, 
particularly given the confidential nature of the private 
placement market. According to SEC regulations, borrowing 
firms are not required to make publically available any 
information pertaining to the private placement of debt, 
including the identity of the lender participating in the 
private placement. We suggest that high quality borrowing 
firms may signal their true value to the market by placing 
debt privately with reputable lenders. Lenders in private 
placements of debt are given access to private information 
about borrowing firms during the credit evaluation and 
negotiation process. Completion of the private placement 
indicates that on the basis of their evaluation of private 
information, a specified lender is willing to provide 
capital to the borrowing firm, thereby indicating their 
confidence in the future prospects of the borrowing firm. 
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Private placements of debt are typically to a small 
number of lenders, thereby establishing new blockholders of 
a firm's securities. These lenders condition covenants 
based on private information supplied by the borrowing firm 
and monitor the firm's activities during the life of the 
loan. A small number of lenders risking their reputational 
capital in a private debt placement have a greater incentive 
to include strict covenants and perform monitoring 
activities than do numerous lenders in public debt 
offerings. Positive excess returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt where the lender 
is specified would be consistent with the argument that 
there is effective monitoring in private debt placements. 
The primary hypotheses of this study revolve around the 
role of insurance companies as credible monitors in private 
placements of debt. Insurance companies are the primary 
lenders in the private placement market. Debt comprises the 
largest component of their asset portfolio. They have 
developed a reputation of providing expert credit evaluation 
in this market. Insurance companies may also purchase 
shares of the borrowing firm's stock over the life of the 
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bond contract. This provides insurance companies with a 
mechanism of recourse similar to the loan renewal process of 
bank loans. High quality borrowing firms may signal their 
true value by privately placing debt with a credible 
monitor, such as an insurance company. 
We will also examine the wealth impact associated with 
other lenders in private placements of debt, such as pension 
funds, banks, and other institutional investors. These 
other lenders in private placements of debt may not be able 
to purchase common stock or face restrictions on the amount 
of stock they may include in their asset portfolio. In this 
case, these lenders will not have the same degree of 
recourse, nor have they developed the same reputation as 
insurance companies in the private placement market. 
Although we have discussed the benefits associated with the 
bank lending process, the number of private placements in 
our sample where a bank is the primary lenders is small. 
Thus, we will be unable to make statistical inferences 
regarding the wealth impact of banks as lenders in the 
private placement market. As a result of these factors, we 
would not expect statistically significant stock price 
responses for these lender categories. 
The stock price response associated with announcements 
of private placements of debt where the lender is specified 
may be related to the type of investment banking firm 
participating in the private placement. Private placements 
of debt are sometimes arranged directly between borrower and 
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lender without the assistance of an investment banker. 
However, in some instances borrowing firms will utilize an 
investment banker to provide advice during the private 
placement process. Investment bankers in private placements 
help bring together borrowing firms and prospective 
investors. Although the terms of the issue are not 
necessarily made publicly available, the market may perceive 
investment bankers to be providing certification and 
monitoring services in private placements similar to those 
associated with public offerings. Since investment 
bankers have reputational capital at stake, they have an 
incentive to ensure that the terms of the issue are 
consistent with private information. Hansen and Torregrosa 
(1992) suggest that investment bankers also have 
reputational capital associated with their monitoring 
service, where monitoring requires investigating the 
borrowing firm with the objective of improving share value. 
In a related context, Slevin, Sushka and Hudson (1990) 
suggest that the greater the reputation of the investment 
banking firm, the more effective the monitoring and 
certification services. They found that firms with equity 
issuances underwritten by the special category of more 
prestigious investment bankers had a significantly less 
negative stock price response than firms utilizing the 
services of other investment banking firms. Based upon this 
result they suggest that the more valuable the reputation of 
the investment banker, the greater the value of the 
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certification and monitoring services they provide. If more 
prestigious investment banking firms are perceived by the 
capital market as providing more valuable certification and 
monitoring services, then utilization of prestigious 
investment banking firms in the private placement process 
would have a favorable impact on firm value. 
As noted by Wruck (1989), Szeczyk and Varma (1991) and 
Fields and Mais (1991), in many instances there is more than 
one lender participating in a single private placement of 
debt. The stock price response associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt may be related 
to the number of lenders participating in the private 
placement. Private placements which specify multiple 
lenders indicate that the borrowing firm may have provided 
firm specific information to more than one lender. As a 
result, completion of the private placement indicates that 
more than one lender is willing to provide capital to the 
borrowing firm, thus providing a signal of their confidence 
in the future prospects of the borrowing firm. Moreover, a 
positive excess return associated with private placements of 
debt which specify more than one lender would be consistent 
with the argument that .there is increased monitoring as a 
result of the private placement since more than one lender 
will be performing monitoring activities. 
However, as more lenders participate in private 
placements of debt, private information regarding the 
borrowing firm is revealed to more lenders, thus diminishing 
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the advantage of privacy of information associated with the 
private placement market. Since several lenders are 
performing monitoring there may ultimately be duplication of 
monitoring efforts and costs. There is also an incentive 
for a lender to free ride on the monitoring activities of 
the other lenders in a private placement of debt. This 
study will examine the wealth impact associated with 
announcements of private placements which specify multiple 
lenders. Moreover, in order to further investigate the role 
of insurance companies in private placements of debt to 
multiple lenders, we will examine the stock price response 
associated with multiple lenders in which the lenders are 
all insurance companies in comparison to private placements 
to multiple lenders which are not insurance companies. 
Given the benefits associated with reputable lenders in 
private placements and the potential costs for multiple 
lenders, we would expect the market to view the reputation 
of the lender to be more important than the number of 
lenders participating in a private placement of debt. 
We hypothesize that announcements of private placements 
of debt to a reputable lender, such as an insurance company, 
will result in a positive stock price response. However, 
the magnitude of this. stock price response will vary across 
firms. Cross-sectional regression analysis will be used to 
examine this differential stock price response. Differences 
in the stock price response among announcements of private 
placements of debt where the lender is specified may result 
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because of the following factors: (1) the size of the debt 
issue as well as the size of the borrowing firm; (2) the 
maturity of the debt issue; and (3) the risk associated with 
the borrowing firm raising capital. 
Private placements of debt establish new blockholders 
of the firm's securities, particularly since private 
placements are generally to a small number of lenders. 
Larger blockholders in private placements of debt have 
greater incentive to engage in monitoring activities than 
numerous lenders in public debt offerings because the 
benefits they receive as a result of monitoring may outweigh 
the costs they incur. The ability of a borrowing firm to 
privately place a relatively large debt issue in relation to 
the size of the borrowing firm may provide positive 
information to the capital market to the extent that it 
reflects the willingness of lenders to make a larger 
commitment of financing. Thus, we would expect a positive 
relationship to be associated with the size of the debt 
issue and the stock price response resulting from 
announcements of private placements of debt. 
The maturity of the debt issue may also contribute to 
the stock price response associated with private placements 
of debt. Easterbrook (1984) and Fama (1985) suggest that 
borrowing firms that issue short-term debt subject 
themselves to periodic evaluation during the loan renewal 
process. A firm's decision to commit to periodic evaluation 
by a reputable monitor may provide a signal regarding 
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management's assessment of the true value of the borrowing 
firm. This would indicate that the maturity of the issue 
and the excess return associated with announcements of 
private placements of debt would be negatively related. As 
discussed previously, private placements of debt have longer 
maturities than short-term debt, such as bank loans, and are 
typically not renewed. Rajan (1992) suggests that the 
lender's ability to purchase common stock provides them with 
recourse similar to short-term bank debt. To the extent 
that the lender's ability to purchase common stock during 
the life of the bond contract substitutes for the positive 
benefits associated with the short-term loan renewal 
process, the inverse relationship between the maturity of 
the debt and the excess return may not hold. 
The stock price response associated with announcements 
of private placements of debt may be related to the risk of 
the borrowing firm issuing debt. Smith and warner (1977) 
argue that private placements contain more restrictive 
covenants than public debt offerings. One possible 
explanation for this is that private placements are more 
likely to be used by riskier firms. As a result, 
differences in default risk may contribute to the stock 
price response associated with announcements of private 
placements of debt. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that 
the stock price response associated with security offerings 
depends on the type of security issued and the sensitivity 
of the value of securities to changes in firm value. 
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Mikkelson and Partch (1986) suggest that one implication of 
this finding is that announcements of security offerings by 
borrowing firms which are considered to have low default 
risk will result in a more positive stock price response. 
In other words, the greater the risk associated with the 
borrowing firm, the less positive the stock price response 
with security issues. As a result, we would expect the 
magnitude of the excess return associated with announcements 
of private placements of debt to be inversely related to the 
riskiness of the borrowing firm. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Previous research investigating the announcement period 
effects of security offerings have utilized event study 
methodology. The objective of an event study is to analyze 
the stock price response associated with the introduction of 
a particular piece of information to the capital market. 
Event study methodology involves calculation of the excess 
return associated with an information event, averaging the 
excess returns associated with the event across all firms 
included in the sample, and the determination of whether the 
average excess return associated with the information event 
is statistically significant. This chapter discusses event 
study methodology in the context of private placements of 
debt, as well as providing a description of the method of 
data collection. A cross-sectional regression model is 
developed to further analyze the wealth impact of private 
placements of debt where the lender is specified. 
Testable Hypotheses 
Table IV summarizes each of the five hypotheses 
specified below. The first hypothesis examines the role of 
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TABLE IV 
HYPOTHESES STATEMENTS 
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There are no abnormal·· returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt in which 
the lender is specified. 
There are positive abnormal returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt where 
the lender is specified. 
There are no abnormal returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt by 
industrial and utility borrowing firms. 
There are positive abnormal returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt by 
industrial firms. 
There are no abnormal returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt for 
specified lender categories. 
There are positive abnormal returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt where 
the lender is an insurance company. 
There are no abnormal returns associated with 
private placements of debt which utilize prestigious 
investment bankers. 
There are positive abnormal returns associated with 
private placements of debt which utilize prestigious 
investment bankers. 
There are no abnormal returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt for 
multiple lenders. 
There are positive abnormal returns associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt for 
multiple lenders. 
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lenders in private placements of debt. Lenders are given 
access to private information about borrowing firms and then 
make lending decisions on the basis of this private 
information. Completion of the private placement of debt 
indicates that the lender is willing to risk its 
reputational capital by lending to the.borrowing firm and 
the lender will in turn monitor their activities, thus 
sending a positive signal to the market. This hypothesis 
will be tested utilizing standard event study methodology. 
The wealth impact associated with a sample of private 
placements of debt where the lender is specified will be 
compared to the wealth impact associated with a sample of 
private placements where no lender is specif~ed. A larger, 
positive excess return resulting from announcements of 
private placements of debt which specify participating 
lenders would provide support for the argument that private 
placements of debt where the lender is specified provides 
positive information to the market about the borrowing firm. 
The second hypothesis will examine the impact of 
utility regulation in private placements of debt where the 
lender is specified. Szewczyk and Varma (1991) found a 
positive excess return associated with private placements by 
utility borrowing firms. Asquith and Mullins (1986) and 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) suggest that utility regulation 
helps to reduce information asymmetries associated with 
security offerings by utility firms. Utility regulation, 
may help alleviate information asymmetries in private 
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placements of debt by utility firms. Therefore, the excess 
return associated with private placements by utility firms 
will be examined as well as the excess return for industrial 
firms. If utility regulation rather than the monitoring and 
certification role of lenders helps reduce information 
asymmetries associated with utility security offerings, then 
we would expect that the reputation of the 
lender does not contribute to the stock price response 
associated with private placements of debt by utilities. 
However, a positive stock price response associated with 
private placements by industrial borrowing firms would be 
consistent with the hypothesis that the monitoring and 
certification role of lenders helps reduce information 
asymmetries, thus providing a positive signal to the market 
about the value of the borrowing firm. 
The next hypothesis will utilize event study 
methodology to examine the wealth impact of the following 
lender categories in private placements of debt, where there 
is only one lender specified in the announcement: 
(1) insurance companies; (2) pension funds; (3) financial 
firms; and (4) other types of institutional investors. If 
the market perceives that a particular category of lender 
provides greater certification services and/or provides more 
effective monitoring relative to other lenders, then a 
positive stock price response would be expected to be 
associated with announcements of private placements of debt 
which specify that type of lender. We suggest that 
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insurance companies have developed a reputation of ·providing 
effective monitoring and certification services in private 
placements of debt. Insurance companies may also purchase 
common stock of the borrowing firm. This provides insurance 
companies with some degree of recourse throughout the life 
of the loan. Other lenders face restrictions regarding the 
amount and type of securities they may purchase. Private 
placements of debt which specify an insurance company as the 
primary lender may result in a positive excess return as a 
result of the reputation of insurance companies as lenders 
in private placements of debt. 
Investment banking firms provide valuable monitoring 
and certification services during the security issuance 
process. Investment bankers have reputational capital at 
stake, since they underwrite and advise many different 
issues over time. If more prestigious investment banking 
firms are perceived by the capital market as providing more 
valuable certification and monitoring services, then 
utilization of prestigious investment banking firms in the 
private placement process would have a favorable impact on 
firm value. Event study methodology will be utilized to 
calculate the stock price response associated with private 
placements of debt which utilize prestigious investment 
banking firms to provide advice during the private placement 
process (Special). The Special category of reputable 
investment bankers is based upon the idea that within the 
investment banking firm industry a small set of prestigious 
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firms dominate the industry (Hayes, 1979). The following 
investment banking firms will be included in the Special 
category of investment banking firms: Goldman, Sachs & Co.; 
First Boston Corp; J.P. Morgan; Salomon Brothers Inc.; 
Merrill Lynch; and Shearson L.ehman. The wealth impact 
associated with the sample of private placements which 
utilize prestigious investment banking firms will be 
compared to a sample of private placements in which no 
investment banker is specified in the private placement 
announcement. A larger, positive excess return associated 
with the Special category of private placements would 
provide support for the arguments that investment bankers 
provide valuable monitoring and certification services 
during the private placement process. 
In many instances there is more than one lender 
participating in a single private placement of debt. The 
stock price response associated with announcements of 
private placements of debt may be related to the number of 
lenders participating in the private placement, since more 
lenders will be performing monitoring activities and the 
lenders are risking their reputational capital. However, 
there is also the possibility of duplication of monitoring 
costs, as well as the free rider problem for private 
placements which have more than one participating lender. 
Event study methodology will be used to calculate the excess 
return for private placements of debt which specify more 
than one participating lender. Given the benefits 
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associated with the monitoring and certification services of 
reputable lenders in private placements of debt, we 
hypothesize that the reputation of the lender rather than 
the number of participating lenders has a greater impact on 
the stock price response associated with private placements 
of debt where the lender is specified. Therefore, an 
insignificant stock price response is expected for private 
placements of debt which specify more than one lender. 
Description of the Sample 
A sample of 734 announcements of private placements of 
debt which occurred during the period January 1980 through 
December 1990 was obtained from Investment Dealer's Digest. 
In order to be included in the final sample, the 
announcements of private placements of debt must meet the 
following criteria: (1) the announcement date of the 
private placement is in the Wall Street Journal or an 
unambiguous date of issue is reported in the Investment 
Dealer's Digest; (2) the common stock of the borrowing 
company is traded on the New York Stock Exchange or American 
Stock Exchange at the time of the private placement; (3) the-
issuing firm has data on the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) Daily Returns file during the year of the 
announcement of the private placement; and (4) there are no 
other contemporaneous announcements concerning the borrowing 
firm reported in the Wall Street Journal two days 
surrounding the announcement. In 404 cases the identity of 
the lender is specified in the private placement 
announcement. The lender is not specified in 331 private 
placements announcements. There are 169 announcements in 
which the borrowing firm utilized a prestigious investment 
banking firm during the private placement process. The 
investment banker is not specified in 138 announcements. 
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There are 186 announcements in which there are multiple 
lenders. This sample is partitioned into the following 
groups: (1) in 39 cases the announcement indicates that 
there are several lenders participating in the private 
placement, however only one lender is specifically 
identified in the announcement; (lAND); (2) in 13 instances 
the announcement indicates that there are several lenders 
participating in the private placement, however only two 
lenders are specified in the announcement (2AND); (3) there 
are 28 announcements which specify only two lenders 
participating in the private placement (LEND2); (4) there 
are 29 announcements which identified three lenders as 
participating in the private placement (LEND3); and (5) in 
77 cases there are more than three lenders participating in 
the private placement of debt (LEND4+). Descriptive 
statistics for the sample of private placements of debt is 
presented in Table V. 
Event Study Methodology 
This research will utilize the market model to obtain 
estimates of abnormal stock price performance associated 
TABLE V 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM THE PERIOD 
JANUARY 1980 THROUGH DECEMBER 1990 
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Panel A: Descriptive statistics for private placements of 
debt where the lender is specified for a sample of 
403 announcements of private placements of debt 
for the period January 1980 through December 1990. 
Descriptive Measure Mean Median 
(Range) 
1. Issue size (millions) 43.0 20.0 
(.61 - 1000) 
2. Market Value Common Stock 1557 610 
(4.9 - 48804) 
3. Relative Size 0.105 0.044 
(. 00001 -- 1. 7) 
4. Maturity (Years) 11 10 
(1 - 30) 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for private placements of 
debt where the lender is not specified for a 
sample of 331 announcements of private placements 
of debt for the period January 1980 through 
December 1990. 
Descriptive Measure Mean Median 
(Range) 
1. Issue size (millions) 48.6 24.5 
(. 728 
-
1000) 
2. Market Value Common Stock 1852 456 
(9. 4 - 57126) 
3. Relative Size 0.136 0.65 
(.0001 
-
1. 88) 
4. Maturity (Years) 10 10 
(1 - 30) 
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with announcements of private placements of debt. The 
market model is a regression model based on the assumption 
that there is a linear relationship between the return of 
any security and the return of a market index. We assume 
that the slope and intercept coefficients generated by the 
regression remain constant over the time period 
investigated. Although the assumptions of the market model 
are somewhat restrictive, Brown and warner (1980,: 1985) have 
found that the market model is more powerful in terms of its 
ability to identify abnormal stock price performance than 
any of the more complex risk-adjusted models. Moreover, 
this methodology is consistent with previous empirical 
studies which utilized event study methodology to measure 
the excess returns associated with announcements of security 
issuances. The excess stock return or daily prediction 
error for firm j on day twill be calculated as follows: 
( 1) 
where Rjt is the actual rate of return of security j on day 
t, and Rmt is the rate of return on the CRSP equal-weighted 
market index on day t. The market model parameters a.j and 
a.. are ordinary least squares estimates of the intercept and 
J 
slope coefficient for firm j using the market model. The 
event date is the day which the announcement of the private 
placement of debt appears in the Investo+ Dealers Digest. 
The market model parameters, a.. and a. are calculated using 
J J 
returns from an estimation period that runs from day -200 
through day -60. 
The daily prediction error (PEjt) is calculated for 
each firm from day -59 through day +20. The daily 
prediction errors are averaged across all firms in the 
sample for each of the 80 event days to produce a daily 
average prediction error, repiesented as: 
N 
(2) APEt = 1/N I PEjt 
j=l 
where tis defined in trading days relative to the 
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announcement event date of the private placement of debt and 
N is equal to the number of firms in the sample. A two-day 
announcement period excess return is then calculated by 
summing the daily prediction errors for day -1 and day O. 
This procedure incorporates the possibility that the 
announcement of the private placement of debt may have been 
made during trading hours the previous day and reported with 
a one-day lag. Given the weekly nature of the Investment 
Dealer's Digest, larger windows are also calculated to 
further examine the wealth impact of private placements of 
debt where .the lender is specified. The two-day 
standardized prediction error for firm j is calculated as 
follows: 
0 
(3) SPE. = IPE.t/S. J J J 
t=-1 
where: 
(4) S. = [2VJ. 2 [1 +1 + (Rmt ... Rm)~]] l/ 2 
J M I (R - R ) 
mt m 
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2 is the residual variance of the market model regression v. 
J 
for firm j, Mis the number of days in the estimation period 
for the market model (140), and Rm is the average market 
return over the estimation period. The average standardized 
two-day prediction error associated with the announcement 
date is given as: 
N 
(5) ASPEt = 1/N E SPEjt 
j=l 
Assuming the individual prediction errors are cross-
sectionally independent a Z-statistic is then computed as 
follows: 
( 6) Z = IN (ASPEt) 
The z-statistic is asymptotically distributed unit normal 
under the hypothesis that the ASPEt equals zero. 
To test for statistical differences between subsamples 
of private placements, a dif:f;erence in means t-test is 
performed where: 
(7) t = 
ASPE 1 
SASPEl - ASPE2 
Assuming unequal variances associated with the 
subsamples, the standard deviation appropriate for this test 
is computed as follows: 
(8) 
where s12 and s 22 are the variances of subsamples one and 
two, and ASPE1 and ASPE 2 are the mean excess return 
associated with subsample one and two. 
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
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A regression model is a formal means of expressing 
essential ingredients of a statistical relationship (Neter, 
Wasserman, and Kutner, 1983). However, in many cases we 
have limited knowledge about the relationships among these 
variables. For instance, we hypothes_ize that announcements 
of private placements of debt which specify participating 
lenders will result in a favorable stock price response. 
The magnitude of this stock price response, however will 
vary across firms. Cross-sectional regression analysis will 
be used to examine this differential stock price response 
associated with private placements of debt. The general 
form of the regression model is presented in Table VI. 
Regressions will be estimated using weighted least squares. 
The standard error of the estimation period residuals is 
used as the weighting _factor to control for 
heteroscedasticity caused by differences in the variance of 
stock returns across firms. 
We hypothesize that private placements of debt by 
borrowing firms which utilize reputable lenders and 
reputable investment banking firms help reduce information 
asymmetries associated with security issues. Masulis and 
Korwar (1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1986) suggest that 
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utility regulation mitigates information asymmetries 
associated with security issues. To further examine the 
impact of utility regulation separately from the 
certification and monitoring role of lenders and investment 
bankers, we estimate two sets of regressions. In one set 
the dependent variable is the excess return associated with 
private placements by industrial firms where the lender is 
specified and the dependent variable in the second set of 
regressions is the excess return associated with utility 
firms where the lender is specified. 
We can group the independent variables into three 
groups; issue related variables, lender variables, and 
investment banking firm variables. The following discussion 
develops the theoretical motivation for the inclusion of the 
independent variables in the regression model. 
Independent Variables 
Issue related variables describe characteristics of the 
private placement issue that are unrelated to the lender 
involved in the private placement. The following issue 
related variables will be included in the regression model: 
(1) the dollar amount of the issue; (2) the log of the 
firm's common stock; (3) the relative size of the issue, 
which is the dollar amount of debt solQ in the private 
placement divided by the market value of the borrowing 
firm's common stock one month prior to the private placement 
announcement; (4) the maturity of the debt issue; 
where: 
ER. 
1 
Bo,•••,B7 
X1,•••,X7 
TABLE VI 
REGRESSION MODEL 
ER. = BO + I: B, X. + E . 1 1 1 1 
= is the two-day announcement period excess 
return associated with announcements of 
private placements of debt for firm i 
= regression coefficients 
= independent variables described below: 
= the dollar amount of the private placement 
issue (SIZE} 
= the log of the market value of the borrowing 
firm's conunon stock the month preceding the 
private placement issue (LOG MV} 
= the dollar amount of the private placement 
issue divided by the market value of the 
conunon stock of the borrowing firm the month 
preceding the private placement issue 
(RELATIVE SIZE} 
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= variable representing the maturity of the debt 
issue (MAT} 
= variable representing the beta of the 
borrowing firm estimated using the market 
model during the estimation period (BETA} 
= dununy variable representing private placements 
in which the primary lender is an insurance 
company (Insurance} 
= dununy variable indicating that the investment 
banking firm was either Goldman, Sachs & Co., 
First Boston Corp., J.P. Morgan, Salmon 
Brothers Inc., Merrill Lynch, or Shearson 
Lehman (Special} 
and (5) the firm's beta, a measure of firm specific risk, 
estimated using the market model during the estimation 
period. 
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Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) found that 
there was no significant relationship between the excess 
return associated with announcements of bank loans or 
private placements of debt and issue related variables, such 
as the size.and maturity of the issue and the size of the 
borrowing firm. However, Szewczyk and Varma (1991) and 
Fields and Mais (1991) found a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the excess return associated 
with announcements of private placements and the relative 
size of the issue. These findings are consistent with the 
argument that there are reduced information asymmetries and 
increased monitoring associated with a private placement of 
debt. In the context of the present study, a positive 
relationship between the excess return associated with 
private placements of debt and the relative size of the 
issue would provide support for the argument that the 
willingness of lenders to take larger positions in the 
firm's securities signals to the market the lender's 
confidence in the firm's prospects and also creates larger 
blockholders who have an incentive to perform increased 
monitoring of the firm's managers. 
In a related context, the excess return associated with 
private placements of debt could reflect the role of the 
size of the borrowing firm. Given the reputation and 
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monitoring activities of the lender, the ability to 
privately place debt may be good news for small firms unable 
to meet the SEC requirements for offering debt publicly. 
However, private placements by larger borrowing firms may 
not provide much news to the capital market since these 
firms have other ways of disseminating information. The 
natural log of the market value of the borrowing firm's 
common stock will be included in the regression model to 
capture these effects. 
The significant stock price response associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt may be 
attributable to the maturity of the issue, particularly 
since private placements of debt typically have shorter 
maturities relative to public issues of debt. Easterbrook 
(1984) and Fama (1985) argue that firms which utilize short-
term debt for their financing needs subject themselves to 
periodic evaluation by outside monitors, such as lenders and 
investment bankers. A firm's decision to commit to periodic 
evaluations can provide a positive signal regarding 
management's assessment of the firm's future earnings 
prospects. It should be noted, however, that private 
placements of debt are not typically considered short-term 
debt and are not usually renewed. Although, lenders may 
purchase the common stock of the borrowing firm which 
provides them with recourse similar to the renewal process 
associated with short-term debt. If the lender's ability to 
purchase stock is similar to the benefits associated with 
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short-term debt, the negative relationship between the 
maturity of the debt issue and the excess return may not 
occur. In order to examine this relationship, the maturity 
of the debt issue will be included in the regression model. 
The stock price response associated with announcements 
of private placements of debt where the lender is specified 
may be related to the riskiness of the borrowing firm 
issuing debt. Smith and Warner (1977) suggest that private 
placements are more likely to be used by riskier firms than 
public debt offerings. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that 
the stock price response to security offerings depends on 
the sensitivity of the value of the new securities to 
changes in firm value. One implication of this finding is 
that private placements of debt by borrowing firms which ar.e 
perceived as being risky will result in a less positive 
stock price response. As a result, we would expect the 
magnitude of the excess return associated with private 
. 
placements of debt where the lender is specified to be 
inversely related to the risk of the borrowing firm. As a 
proxy for the risk of the borrowing firm, the beta estimated 
with the market model during the estimation period will be 
included in the regression model. 
Finally, a dummy variable that indicates private 
placements of debt in which an insurance company is the 
primary lender will be included in some of the regression 
models in order to further examine the certification and 
monitoring role of reputable lenders. In addition, a dummy 
variable for private placements which utilize the Special 
category of investment banking firms will be included in 
some of the regression models in order to further examine 
the impact of the prestige of investment banking firms 
participating in private placements of debt. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Stock Price Response to Private Placements 
Table VII presents a summary of the notation that will 
be used in Tables VIII through XXVI that follow. Given the 
weekly nature of the Investment Dealer's Digest, excess 
returns were calculated for a five day event window (-5,0) 
in addition to the two day event window (-1,0). The results 
of the analysis utilizing a five day event window were not 
statistically different from the results produced using a 
two day event window. Thus, we report only the results for 
the two day event period. 
The two-day announcement period (,1,0) excess return 
(APE) for subsamples of private placements of debt are 
presented in Table 8 on page 80. For the full sample of 
announcements of private placements of debt the excess 
return for the window (-1, 0) .is +.19% with a z-statistic of 
2.48 which is significantly different from zero at the .01 
level. For industrial offerings, tne excess return is +.15% 
with a Z-statistic of 1.72 which is significant a:t the .05 
level and the excess return for utilities is +.45% with a 
z-statistic of 2.14 which is also significant at the .05 
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Lender is 
Specified 
Lender is not 
Specified 
Industrial 
Utility 
Financial 
Insurance 
Pension 
Financial 
Other 
MORE 
!AND 
2AND 
LEND2 
LEND3 
TABLE VII 
NOTATION TO BE ANALYZED 
= the lender is specified in the private 
placement announcement 
= the lender is not specified in the private 
placement announcement 
= the borrowing firm is classified as an 
industrial firm 
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= the borrowing firm is a public utility (SIC 
4900-4999) 
= the borrowing firm is a financial firm (SIC 
6000-6900 except for conglomerates having 
SIC 6711) 
= the lender participating in the private 
placement is one insurance company 
- the lender participating in the private 
placement is one pension fund 
= the lender participating in the private 
placement is one bank or financial firm 
= there is one lender specified in the private 
placement announcement but it is not 
insurance, pension or financial 
= there is more than one lender specified in 
the private placement announcement 
= the announcement indicates that several 
lenders are participating, but only one 
lender is identified 
= the announcement indicates that several 
lenders are participating, but only two 
lenders are identified 
= two lenders are specified in the private 
placement announcement 
= three lenders are specified in the private 
placement announcement 
LEND4+ 
LEND2 INS 
LEND3 INS 
LEND4+ INS 
LEND2 0TH 
LEND3 0TH 
LEND4+ 0TH 
TABLE VII (Continued) 
= four or more lenders are specified in the 
private placement announcement 
= both lenders are insurance companies 
= all three lenders are insurance companies 
= all of the lenders specified are insurance 
companies 
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= at least one of the lenders specified is not 
an insurance company 
= at least one of the lenders specified is not 
an insurance company 
= at least one of the lenders specified is not 
an insurance company 
Special = the investment banking firm utilized is 
either Goldman Sachs, First Boston, J.P. 
Morgan, Salomon Brothers, Merrill Lynch, or 
Shearson Lehman 
NOIB = no investment banking firm is specified in 
the private placement announcement 
NO-Insurance = the lender is specified in the announcement, 
but it is not one insurance company 
Subscripts 
a 
b 
C 
d 
e 
= significant at the .01 level 
= significant at the .05 level 
= significant at the .10 level 
= the excess return for subsamples of lAND and 
2AND was not calculated since the precise 
number of lender participating in the 
private placement is not known 
= the subsample includes no private placement 
announcements or only one announcement 
TABLE VIII 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE OF 
PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT 
Sample Percentage 
Category APE Z-Stat Positive 
Full sample +.19 2.48a .51 
Industrials +.15 1.72b .50 
Financials ,... • 05 .44 .50 
Utilities +.45 2.14b .56 
Lender is specified +.38 2.33a .53 
Industrials +.27 1. 62c .53 
Financials +.63 1.29c .57 
Utilities +.59 1.68b .51 
No lender is specified +.07 1. 07 .48 
Industrials +.01 .76 .46 
Financials -.39 -.37 .46 
Utilities +.64 1.30c .62b 
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Sample 
Size 
734 
577 
42 
115 
403 
326 
14 
63 
331 
251 
28 
52 
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level. The positive stock price response associated with 
private placements by utilities is consistent with the 
findings of Szewczyk and Varma (1991). However, these 
findings are in sharp contrast to the negative stock price 
response associated with private placements of straight 
debt noted by James (1987) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986). 
When the sample is.divided into announcements of 
private placements of debt where the lender is specified and 
announcements where no lender is specified it is evident 
that the significant excess return associated with the full 
sample of private placements is attributable to private 
placements which specify pa.rticipating lenders. For the 
sample where the lender is specified, the excess return is 
+.38% with a Z-statistic of 2.33 which is significantly 
different from zero at the .01 level. Although the 
announcement period excess return for the sample where no 
lender is specified is +.07%, it is not significant. The 
statistically significant positive stock price response 
associated with private placements of debt where the lender 
is specified provides support for the argument that high 
quality borrowing firms which specify reputable lenders in 
the private placement announcement signals positive 
information to the market as a result of the certification 
and monitoring roles of these lenders. 
A difference in means t-test is performed to test the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the APE for 
announcements of private placements where the lender is 
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known and where the lender is not identified. A summary of 
the results of the difference in means test associated with 
subsamples of private placements reported in Table VIII is 
presented in Table IX. The difference between the mean 
exce.ss return associated with private placements of debt 
where the lender is specified and private placements where 
no lender is specified is statistically significant at the 
.05 level. These findings are unchanged when industrial 
borrowing firms are analyzed separately. Although the 
excess return associated with utility and financial 
borrowing firms is.more positive for private placements of 
debt where the lender is specified, the difference between 
the mean excess return associated with each of these 
subsamples of private placements is not statistically 
significant. 
TABLE .IX 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN MEANS TESTS 
FOR THE FULL SAMPLE 
LENDER IS 
SPECIFIED Industrial Utility Financial 
NO LENDER 
2.lb SPECIFIED 
;_4b Industrial 1. 2 1. 3 
Utility .97 1.6 -.82 
Financial -.25 .34 • 95 
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Stock Price Response for a Single Lender 
If the market perceives that a particular category of 
lender participating in private placements of debt provide 
greater certification services and/or perform more effective 
monitoring activities relative to other lenders, then a 
positive stock price response would be expected to be 
associated with that type of lender. Table X presents the 
excess returns for announcements of private placements of 
debt for the following categories of lenders: (1) insurance 
companies; (2) pension funds; (3) banks and financial firms; 
and (4) other institutional investors. The excess returns 
associated with these lender categories for private 
placements by industrial, utility and financial borrowing 
firms are presented in Table XI, Table XII and Table XIII 
respectively. The excess return reported in Table X for 
private placements of debt where the primary lender is an 
insurance company is +.40% with a z-statistic of 2.15 which 
is significantly different from zero at the .OS level. 
Although the excess returns associated with the lender 
categories of pension funds, financial firms and other 
institutional investors are +.33%, -1.86%, and 1.40% 
respectively, these results are based on smaller subsamples 
of private placement announcements and the excess returns 
are not statistically different from zero. When industrial 
borrowing firms are analyzed separately the excess return 
associated with insurance companies is +.44% and is 
statistically significant at the .05 level. The excess 
return associated with the other individual lender 
categories for industrial borrowing firms are not 
significant. Moreover, the excess return associated with 
private placements by utility and borrowing firms for each 
of the individual lender categories are not significant. 
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The positive excess return associated with private 
placements by industrial firms where the primary lender is 
an insurance company provides support for the hypothesis 
that insurance companies have developed a reputation of 
providing effective certification and monitoring services in 
private placements of debt. Insurance companies are given 
access to private information about the borrowing firm's 
financial prospects and then evaluate the borrowing firm's 
securities on the basis of this private information. We 
suggest that insurance companies.have developed a reputation 
of providing expert credit evaluation during this process, 
particularly given that insurance companies are the dominant 
lender in the private placement market and debt comprises 
the largest component of their asset portfolio. Thus, 
insurance companies render a quality certification of the 
borrowing firm by their willingness to purchase the firm's 
debt and monitor the firm during the maturity of the loan. 
These roles are particularly enhanced given that insurance 
companies can also purchase common stock of the borrowing 
firm, thus providing them with recourse to affect the 
borrowing firm's decision process. Rajan (1992) suggests 
TABLE X 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT 
WHERE THE LENDER IS SPECIFIED 
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Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE Z-Stat Positive Size 
Lender categories 
Single Lender 
Insurance 
Pension funds 
Financial 
Other 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE 
MORE subsamples 
lAND 
2AND 
LEND2 
LEND3 
LEND4+ 
+.40 
+.33 
-1. 86 
+1. 40 
+.19 
+.14 
-.18 
+1.16 
+.40 
-.15 
2.15b 
.59 
-.83 
1.19 
1. 09 
.69 
.29b 
2.25 
.19 
-.39 
.52 
.48 
.so 
.67 
.55 
.54 
.46 
.54 
.48 
.60 
Subsamples of MORE where the lenders are insurance 
companiesd 
LEND2 insurance 
LEND3 insurance 
LEND4+ insurance 
+1. 60 
+.87 
-.22 
1.68b 
.82 
-.67 
.64 
.58 
.55 
Subsamples of MORE where the lenders are not insurance 
companies 
LEND2 other 
LEND3 other 
LEND4+ other 
+.84 
-.49 
-.10 
1. 62c 
-.81 
-.03 
.43 
.30 
.63 
189 
21 
4 
3 
186 
39 
13 
28 
29 
77 
14 
19 
29 
14 
10 
48 
TABLE XI 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT BY 
INDUSTRIAL FIRMS WHERE THE LENDER IS SPECIFIED 
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Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE Z-Stat Positive Size 
Lender categories 
Single Lender 
Insurance 
Pension funds 
Financial 
Other 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE 
MORE subsamples 
!AND 
2AND 
LEND2 
LEND3 
LEND4+ 
+.44 
+.45 
-2 67 
. e 
+.12 
+.37 
-.69 
+1. 01 
+.61 
-.38 
2.08b 
.75 
-1. 06 
.16 
.96 
-.67 
1.16 
.54 
-1. 26 
.53 
.56 
.33 
.55 
.54 
.46 
.50 
.52 
.56 
Subsamples of MORE where all the lenders are insurance 
companies d 
LEND2 insurance 
LEND3 insurance 
LEND4+ insurance 
+1. 28 
+1.14 
-.52 
.89 
.95 
-1. 34c 
.62 
.60 
.48 
Subsamples of MORE where the lenders are not insurance 
companies 
LEND2 other 
LEND3 other 
LEND4+ other 
+.82 
-.31 
-.29 
.90 
-.28 
-.53 
.43 
.43 
.62 
160 
18 
3 
145 
29 
9 
22 
23 
62 
13 
15 
25 
9 
7 
37 
TABLE XII 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT BY 
UTILITY FIRMS WHERE THE LENDER IS SPECIFIED 
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Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE z-stat Positive Size 
Lender categories 
Single Lender 
Insurance 
Pension funds 
Financial 
Other 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE 
MORE subsamples 
lAND 
2AND 
LEND2 
LEND3 
LEND4+ 
+.41 
-. 3J 
e 
+.29 
-1.19 
+.11 
+l. 69 
-.40 
+.82 
1. 08 
-.27 
-.99 
+.22 
2.63a 
-.66 
+l. 66b 
.48 
.00 
.57 
.38 
.so 
.67 
.33 
.73 
Subsam~le~ of MORE where all the lenders are insurance 
companies · 
LEND2 insurance 
LEND3 insurance 
LEND4+ insurance 
e 
-.14 
+1.64 
-.06 
+l. 49C 
.so 
1. 00 
Subsamples of MORE where the lenders are not insurance 
companies 
LEND2 other 
LEND3 other 
LEND4+ other 
+.88 
-.91 
+.53 
+l. Slc 
-1.06 
+1.04 
.6 
.00 
.64 
23 
3 
36 
8 
2 
6 
6 
15 
4 
4 
5 
2 
11 
93 
TABLE XIII 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT FOR 
FINANCIAL FIRMS WHERE THE LENDER IS SPECIFIED 
Sample Category 
Lender categories 
Single Lender 
Insurance 
Pension funds 
Financial 
Other 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE 
MORE subsamples 
lAND 
2AND 
LEND2 
LEND3 
LEND4+ 
Subsamples of MORE where 
companiesd 
LEND2 insurance 
LEND3 insurance 
LEND4+ insurance 
Subsamples of MORE 
companies 
LEND2 other 
LEND3 other 
LEND4+ other 
where 
APE 
- 66 • e 
e 
+2.63 
+1. 39 
+2.13 
+1. 1e9 
all 
e 
e 
the 
e 
e 
e 
Z-Stat 
-.80 
C 
+1. 38b 
+1. 95 
lenders 
Percentage Sample 
Positive Size 
are 
.33 
1. 00 
.60 
1. 00 
.50 
insurance 
6 
2 
5 
2 
2 
the lenders are not insurance 
e 
e 
e 
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this is similar to the renewal process associated with 
short-term bank loans. Therefore, high quality borrowing 
firms which place debt privately with insurance companies 
provide a signal to the capital market about the true value 
associated with their future financial prospects. 
The insignificant results associated with the 
individual lender categories for private placements by 
utility firms provide support for the argument that utility 
regulation, rather than the monitoring and certification 
roles of reputable lenders, helps mitigate information 
asymmetries associated with private placements of debt by 
utility firms. Szewczyk and Varma (1991) found a positive 
stock response associated with private placements by 
utilities. They suggest that their results provide support 
for the argument that private placements of debt provide 
positive information to the market about the value of the 
borrowing firm. However, Asquith and Mullins (1986) and 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) found that utility regulation 
helps reduce information asymmetries associated with 
security offerings by utility firms. We found that 
the stock price response associated with the full sample of 
115 announcements of private placements of debt by utility 
borrowing firm's is +.45% which is significant at the .05 
level. Whereas, the excess returns for private placements 
by utilities for the individual lender categories are not 
significant. These results provide support for the argument 
that utility regulation is more important than the 
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reputation of lenders in contributing to the positive stock 
price response associated with private placements of debt by 
utility borrowing firms. 
Stock Price Response for Multiple Lenders 
In many instances there is more than one lender 
participating in a single private placement of debt. There 
are 186 announcements included in the full sample which 
specify more than one lender participating in the private 
placement of debt. In order to examine the relationship 
between the stock price response associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt and the number 
of lenders participating in the private placement, the 
excess return is calculated for private placements which 
specify multiple lenders, noted as MORE in Table X. For the 
window (-1,0) the excess return for the MORE category is 
+.19% with a Z-statistic of 1.09 which is not significant. 
The results are unchanged when industrial and utility 
borrowing firms are analyzed separately. Although the 
excess return associated with financial borrowing firms 
which specified more than one lender is statistically 
significant, there are only five announcements included in 
the subsample and one announcement appears to be the primary 
contributing factor to the excess return. 
These results indicate that the costs resulting from 
private placements which have multiple lenders may 
contribute to the insignificant stock price response. It 
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should be noted, however, that the multiple lender category 
(MORE) includes announcements of private placements where 
the number of lenders can range from two lenders up to 
thirty-five lenders. Perhaps private placements which have 
fewer participating lenders help reduce the costs resulting 
from multiple lender monitoring discussed previously. We 
investigate the following subsamples of the multiple lender 
category (MORE): (1) the announcement indicates that 
several lenders are participating in the private placement, 
although only one lender is specifically identified in the 
private placement announcement (lAND); (2) the announcement 
indicates that several lenders are participating, but only 
two lenders are specifically identified (2AND); (3) only two 
specified lenders participated in the private placement 
(LEND2); (4) three lenders are identified in the private 
placement announcement (LEND3); and (5) there are more than 
three specified participating lenders identified in the 
private placement announcement (LEND4+). These results are 
reported in Table X, Table XI, Table XII and Table XIII 
respectively. 
For the subsample LEND2, the excess return is +1.16% 
with a z-statistic of 2.25 which is significant at the .OS 
level. The stock price response associated with the other 
subsamples of private placements where there is more than 
one specified lender are not significant. The excess return 
reported in Table XI for the subsample LEND2 where the 
borrowing firm is an industrial firm is not statistically 
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significant. Although the excess return associated with 
LEND2 and LEND4+ for utility borrowing firms are significant 
at the .01 and .05 level respectively, the results are based 
on relatively small subsamples of private placements. These 
findings provide some support for the argument that private 
placements of debt which specify two participating lenders 
have a favorable impact on firm value, however, the results 
are not conclusive. 
There is a positive stock price response associated 
with private placements by industrial firms where the 
primary lender is an insurance company. These results 
provide support for the hypothesis that insurance companies 
have developed a reputation of providing more effective 
monitoring and certification services relative to other 
lenders in private placements of debt. In order to 
determine the role of insurance companies in private 
placements of debt which specify multiple lenders, the 
excess return is calculated for subsamples of LEND2, LEND3, 
and LEND4+ in which all of the specified lenders are 
insurance companies. It should be noted that the role of 
insurance companies associated with the subsamples lAND and 
2AND will not be examined since the precise number of 
lenders participating in the private placements is not 
known. The excess return associated with the subsample 
LEND2 in which both lenders are insurance companies is 
+1.60% with a Z-statistic of 1.68 which is significant at 
the .05 level. However, this result appears to be due to 
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one outlier since the excess returns for subsamples of LEND2 
where both lenders are insurance companies for industrial, 
utility and financial firms are not statistically 
significant (see Tables X, XI, and XII). The excess returns 
for subsamples of LEND3 and LEND4+ are also not significant. 
In summary, these results provide some support for the 
argument that private placements which specify two lenders 
convey favorable information about the borrowing firm to the 
capital market, particularly if the lenders are both 
insurance companies. However, when industrial, utility and 
financial borrowing firms are analyzed separately, the 
excess returns associated with LEND2 subsamples are not 
statistically significant. The insignificant results 
associated with private placements which specify more than 
two lenders may indicate the possibility of inefficiencies. 
Since several lenders are performing monitoring activities 
there is ultimately duplication of monitoring efforts and 
costs. In a related context, with several lenders 
participating in the private placement, ~rivate information 
regarding the borrowing firm is revealed to several lenders 
thus diminishing the advantage of privacy of information 
associated with the private placement market. This may also 
provide evidence of the free rider problem, where some 
lenders receive the benefits resulting from monitoring 
activities performed by another lender without incurring the 
necessary costs. Therefore, given the mixed results 
associated with multiple lenders and the positive stock 
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price response for private placements where the lender is a 
single insurance company, it appears that the reputation of 
the lender rather than the number of lenders is the most 
important factor contributing to the stock price response 
for private placements of debt where the lender is 
specified. 
Stock Price Response Associated with 
Investment Banking Firm Categories 
Table XIV presents the two-day announcement period 
excess returns for announcements of private placements of 
debt where the sample has been stratified by investment 
banker category. For the full sample of private placements 
where the borrowing firm utilized a prestigious investment 
banker, noted as Special in Table XIV, the excess return for 
the window (-1,0) is +.14% which is not statistically 
significant. Although the excess return associated with 
financial borrowing firms which utilized reputable 
investment bankers is significant at the .05 level, the 
analysis is based on a small sample with two borrowing firms 
driving the significant positive stock price response. It 
appears that factors other than the prestige of the 
investment banking firm contributes to the stock price 
response associated with private placements of debt. This 
result is further supported by examining the stock price 
response associated with the full sample of private 
placements of debt in which no investment banker is 
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specified in the private placement announcement, noted as 
NOIB in Table XIV. The excess return associated with NOIB 
is +.46%, but is not statistically significant. The 
difference in the mean excess return between these two 
samples is not statistically· ·significant. 
The excess returns associated with the investment 
banking firm categories for subsamples of private placements 
of debt are also examined to provide further evidence 
regarding the certification and monitoring roles of lenders 
and investment bankers. Table XV presents the stock price 
response associated with the Special and NOIB investment 
banking firm categories for the sample of private placements 
of debt where the lender is specified. Table XVI presents 
the excess return for investment banking firm categories for 
private placements of debt where no lender is specified. 
For the sample of private placements by industrial 
firms where the lender is specified and a prestigious 
investment banking firm is utilized the excess return is 
+.66% with a z-statistic of 2.24 which is significant at the 
I 
.OS level. The excess return for private placements by 
industrial firms where the lender and investment banking are 
not specified is +.50% with a Z-statistic of .42 which is 
not significant. The excess return for industrial firms 
where no lender is specified using a Special category of 
investment banker is -.40% which is not statistically 
significant. For the sample of industrial borrowing firms 
TABLE XIV 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT 
FOR INVESTMENT BANKER CATEGORIES 
Percentage 
Sample Category APE Z-Stat Positive 
Special Category of Investment Bankers 
Full sample +.14 1. 02 .so 
Industrialsd +.27 1. soc .55 
Financials +1. 02 1.69b .70 
Utilities -.54 -1. 43c .32 
No Investment Banking Firm (NOIB) 
Full sample +.46 1. 46c .57 
Industrials +.38 1. 25 .56 
Financials +.42 1.12 .62 
Utilities -.04 -.27 .56 
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Sample 
Size 
169 
122 
10 
37 
138 
116 
13 
9 
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TABLE XV 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT WHERE THE 
LENDER IS SPECIFIED FOR INVESTMENT 
BANKING FIRM CATEGORIES 
Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE Z-Stat Positive Size 
seecial Category of Investment Bankers 
Lender is seecified +.45 1.89b .55 106 
Industrialsd +.66 2.24b .62 78 
Financials +1.80 1.97b .67 3 
Utilities -.38 -.74 .32 25 
No Investment Banking: Fi.rm (NOIB) 
Lender is seecified +.36 1.47c .55 118 
Industrials +.36 1.18 .54 98 
Financials +.23 .16 .63 8 
Utilities +.43 1.12 .56 12 
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TABLE XVI 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT WHERE NO 
LENDER IS SPECIFIED FOR INVESTMENT 
BANKING FIRM CATEGORIES 
Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE Z-Stat Positive Size 
s:eecial Category of Investment Bankers 
No Lender is S:eecified -.37 -.79 .43 63 
Industrials d -.40 -.48 .41 44 
Utilities +.68 .72 .71 7 
Financials -.85 -1. 44c .33 12 
No Investment Banking: Firm (NOIB) 
No Lender is s:eecified +1. 05 .27c .65 20 
Industrials +.50 .42 .67 18 
Financials e 
Utilities e 
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where the lender is known with no investment banking firm 
identified in the private placement announcement, the excess 
return is +.36% which is not significant. Based upon these 
results, the positive excess return for private placements 
of debt by industrial firms where the lender is specified 
and a prestigious investment banking firm is utilized 
provides support for the hypothesis that reputable lenders 
and investment bankers provide valuable services in private 
placements of debt. 
Table XV and Table XVI also present the stock price 
response associated with private placements of debt for the 
investment banking firm categories where the borrowing firm 
is a utility. The excess return for the sample where the 
lender is specified and a prestigious investment banking 
firm is utilized is -.38% with a z-statistic of -.74, which 
is not statistically significant. Although announcements 
which identify a prestigious investment banker but do not 
identify the lender participating in the private placement 
result in an excess return of +.68%, it is not statistically 
significant. For private placements by utilities where the 
investment banker is not known but the announcement 
specifies the lender the excess return is +.43%, which is 
not statistically different from zero. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that utility regulation is 
more important in reducing information asymmetries for 
utility private placements than the benefits associated with 
reputable lenders and investment bankers. 
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Table XVII presents the excess return for the 
investment banking firm categories associated with 
announcements of private placements for single and multiple 
lenders. The excess returns for the above categories of 
private placements by industrial, utility and financial 
borrowing firms are presented in Table XVIII, Table XIX and 
Table XX, respectively. In order to consider the relative 
importance of reputable lenders and investment bankers as 
well as the impact of utility regulation in private 
placements of debt, Table XXI presents summary results for 
private placements by industrial and utility firms for 
subsamples of investment banking firm categories where 
(1) the primary lender is an insurance company (noted as 
Insurance in Table XXI); and (2) the lender is specified in 
the private placement announcement, but the primary lender 
is not an insurance company (noted as NO-Insurance in Table 
XXI). Table XXII presents a summary of the results of the 
difference in means tests associated with subsamples of 
private placements included in Table XXI. 
The excess return reported in Table XXI for private 
placements by industrial firms for the subsample Insurance 
and Special is +1.48% with a Z-statistic of 2.74 which is 
statistically significant at the .01 level. It should be 
noted that the excess returns associated with private 
placements with pension funds which utilized the Special 
category of investment bankers are not significant. The 
stock price response associated with the subsample Insurance 
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TABLE XVII 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT FOR LENDER 
CATEGORIES AND INVESTMENT BANKING FIRM CATEGORIES 
Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE Z-Stat Positive Size 
Special Category of Investment Bankers 
Single Lender 
Insurance +1.12 2.27b .58 28 
Pension funds +.25 .28 .63 8 
Financial e 
Other e 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE +.23 .85 .56 69 
No Investment Banking Firm (NOIB) 
Single Lender 
Insurance +.13 .57 .51 85 
Pension funds +.70 .69 .57 7 
Financial e 
Other e 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE +l. 08 1. 60c .69b 22 
TABLE XVIII 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENT OF DEBT BY 
INDUSTRIAL FIRMS AND INVESTMENT 
BANKING FIRM CATEGORIES 
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Percentage Sample 
Sample Category · APE z-stat Positive Size 
Special Category of Investment Bankers 
Single Lender 
Insurance +1.48 2.74a .68 22 
Pension funds +.64 .57 .20 5 
Financial e 
Other e 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE +.36 .85 .56 50 
No Investment Banking Fil;111 (NOIB) 
Single Lender 
Insurance +.14 .56 .51 72 
Pension funds +.70 .69 .57 7 
Financial e 
Other e 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE +1.14 1.19 .67 18 
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TABLE XIX 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT BY UTILITY 
FIRMS AND INVESTMENT BANKING FIRM CATEGORIES 
Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE Z-Stat Positive Size 
Special Category of Investment Bankers 
Single Lender 
Insurance -.16 -.35 .17 6 
Pension funds -.39 -.27 .oo 3 
Financial e 
Other e 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE -.46 -.59 .44 16 
No Investment Banking Firm · (NOIB) 
Single Lender 
Insurance +.25 .so .50 8 
Pension funds e 
Financial e 
Other e 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE +.79 +1.23 .75 4 
TABLE XX 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT BY 
FINANCIAL FIRMS AND INVESTMENT 
BANKING FIRM CATEGORIES 
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Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE Z-Stat 
Special Category of. Investment Bankers 
Single Lender 
Insurance e .,.. 
Pension funds e 
Financial e 
Other e 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE +1.80 
No Investment Banking Firm (NOIB} 
Single Lender 
Insurance 
Pension funds 
Financial 
Other 
Multiple Lenders 
MORE 
-.78 
e 
e 
e 
... 
e 
+1. 97b 
-.87 
Positive Size 
.67 3 
.60 5 
TABLE XXI 
ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT BY 
INDUSTRIAL AND UTILITY FIRMS WHERE THE LENDER IS 
AN INSURANCE COMPANY FOR INVESTMENT BANKING 
FIRM CATEGORIES AND WHERE THE LENDER IS 
NOT AN INSURANCE COMPANY FOR 
INVESTMENT BANKING 
FIRM CATEGORIES 
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Percentage Sample 
Sample Category APE 
Insurance - Special Category 
Industrials 
Utilities 
Insurance - NOIB Cate~ory 
Industrials 
Utilities 
+l. 48 
-.16 
+.14 
+.25 
NO-Insurance - Special Category 
Industrials 
Utilities 
+.34 
-.45 
NO-Insurance - NOIB Category~ 
Industrials 
Utilities 
+l. 02 
+.79 
Z-Stat 
-.35 
.56 
.so 
.92 
-.65 
1. 23 
Positive Size 
.68 
.17 
.51 
.so 
.59 
.37 
.64 
.75 
22 
6 
72 
8 
56 
19 
25 
4 
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TABLE XXII 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN MEANS TEST FOR PRIVATE 
PLACEMENTS OF DEBT BY INDUSTRIAL FIRMS FOR LENDER 
CATEGORIES AND INVESTME~T BANKING 
FIRM CATEGORIES 
Ins Ins NO-Ins NO-Ins 
Special NOIB Special NOIB 
Ins Special 2.lb 1. 9c 1.1 
Ins NOIB 2.lb 1. 4 -1. 3 
NO-Ins Special 1. 9C 1. 4 -.25 
NO-Ins NOIB 1.1 -1. 3 -.25 
1 
- the difference between the mean excess return associated 
with the above subsamples for private placements by utility 
borrowing firms is not significant for any pair of 
subsamples. 
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and NOIB is +.14% which is not significant. Moreover, the 
difference between the mean excess return associated with 
private placements to insurance companies utilizing a 
Special category investment banker and private placements to 
insurance companies not utilizing an investment banker is 
significant at the .05 level. 
In order to further isolate the role of the investment 
banking firm in private placements of debt, an excess return 
is calculated for investment banking firm categories for the 
subsample of private placements where the lender is 
specified in the private placement announcement, but is not 
an insurance company. The excess returns for private 
placements with a lender that is not an insurance company 
utilizing a Special category investment banking firm and 
private placements in which no investment banking firm is 
specified where the lender is not an insurance company are 
not significant. Based upon these results, it appears that 
private placements of debt by industrial firms which utilize 
a prestigious investment banking firm and the participating 
lender is an insurance company provide positive information 
to the capital market regarding the true value of the 
borrowing firm. 
Table XXI also presents the excess return for these 
subsamples of private placements by utility borrowing firms. 
However, the excess returns associated with the above 
subsamples for utility borrowing firms are not significant. 
This results provides further support for the argument that 
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the impact of utility regulation is more important than the 
reputation of the lender or investment banking firm in 
private placements of debt by utility borrowing firms. 
Finally, it should be noted that when the excess return 
is calculated for the above subsamples of private placements 
by financial firms, in general, none of the subsamples 
result in a significant stock price response. The excess 
return associated with private placements for the subsample 
MORE and Special is significant, however, there are only 
three announcements included in the subsample. 
Regression Analysis 
The stock price response associated with announcements 
of private placements where the lender is specified is 
analyzed using regression analysis. The complete regression 
model is presented in Table VI. We estimate two sets of 
regressions, one for industrial firms and the other for 
utilities. In both regressions the dependent variable is 
the announcement period excess return for the window (-1,0). 
Regressions are estimated using weighted least squares with 
the standard error of the estimation period residuals used 
as the weighting factor to adjust for hetroscedasticity 
caused by different variance of stock returns across firms. 
In this section the results of the regression analysis will 
be discussed along with the implications of these results in 
the context of this study. 
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Size Related Variables 
Since private placements involve a relatively small 
number of lenders in comparison to public offerings of debt, 
private placements establish new blockholders of the firm's 
securities. The ability of a borrowing firm to privately 
place a relatively large debt issue may convey positive 
information to the capital market in that it reflects the 
willingness of lenders to make a large conunitment of funds. 
The creation of larger blockh~lders may also result in 
increased monitoring of the borrowing firm as a result of 
the debt issue. The importance of this may also be related 
to the size of the issue in relation to the size of the 
borrowing firm. Therefore, we expect that there is a 
positive relationship between the size variables and the 
excess return associated with private placements of debt 
where the lender is specified. In equations 1, 2, and 3 of 
Table XXIII the impact of the size of the issue and 
borrowing firm is examined by regressing the announcement 
period excess return on the dollar amount of the debt issue 
(SIZE), the natural log of the market value of the borrowing 
firm's conunon stock in the month prior to the private 
placement issue (LOG MV) and also on the dollar amount of 
the issue divided by the market value of the borrowing 
firm'· s conunon stock (REL SIZE) • 
For industrial borrowing firms, the coefficients for 
SIZE and LOG MV are not statistically significant. However, 
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the coefficient for relative size is -3.14 and is 
significant at the .01 level (t = -2.56). This finding 
provides evidence of a negative relationship between the 
excess return associated with private placements of debt and 
the relative size of the issue. This result is puzzling 
given that apriori a positive relationship was expected 
between the size variables and the excess return. This 
indicates that some factor associated with the issue, such 
as risk factors or potential agency problems resulting from 
the debt issue are not captured in the regression model. 
Equations 1.2, 2.2 and 3.2 of Table XXIII present the 
regression results for private placements by utility 
borrowing firms. The coefficient estimates for SIZE, REL 
SIZE and LOG MV are not significant. Based upon these 
results it appears that factors other than the size 
variables contribute to the stock price response associated 
with private placements of debt by utility firms. It should 
be noted that Szewczyk and Varma (1991) found a 
statistically significant positive relationship between the 
excess return associated with private placements by utility 
firms and the relative size of the debt issue. However, 
their sample included a larger number of private placements 
(293 announcements in comparison to 63 in the present study) 
and extended over a longer time period (included 
announcements by utilities from 1963 to 1986 in comparison 
to 1980 to 1990 in this study). Moreover, when they 
included variables representing the borrowing firm's 
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TABLE XXIII 
ESTIMATE OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS WHERE THE 
LENDER IS SPECIFIED FOR INDUSTRIAL FIRMS AND 
UTILITY FIRMS FOR ISSUE RELATED VARIABLES 
Variable Coefficient. Constant R2 
Equ. (t-stat) (t;..stat) (F) 
SIZE 
1.1 .00 12.49 .001 
(. 30) (1.18) (. 09) 
1. 2 .01 12.43 .02 
( 1. 09} (. 50) (1. 20) 
REL SIZE 
2.1 -3.14 
(-2.56}a 
30.07 
(2.52)a 
.02 
(6.54)a 
2.2 1. 65 19.35 .01 
(. 72) (. 79) (. 52) 
LOG MV 
3.1 -.01 14.11 .001 
(-. 03) (. 51) (.001) 
3.2 .06 -62.61 • 04 
(1. 61) (-1.03) (2.59) 
MAT 
4.1 -.02 24.40 .002 
(-. 81) (1.45) (. 65) 
4.2 .03 7.63 .01 
(. 79) (. 22) (. 63} 
BETA 
5.1 .01 13.29 .001 
(.006) (. 61) (.001) 
5.2 .65 -4.62 .02 
( 1. 23) (-. 14) (1.52) 
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participation in the public debt market, the importance of 
the relative size of the debt issue was diminished. 
Maturity Variables 
The significant stock price response associated with 
announcements of private placements of debt may be 
attributable to the maturity of the issue. Easterbrook 
(1984) and Fama (1985) argue that firms which utilize 
short-term debt for their financing needs subject themselves 
to periodic evaluation by outside monitors, such as lenders 
and investment bankers. A firm's decision to commit to 
periodic evaluations can provide a positive signal regarding 
management's assessment of the firm's future earnings 
prospects. This would indicate an inverse relationship 
between the excess return and the maturity of the debt 
issue. Although private placements of debt are typically 
not renewed, the lender's ability to purchase common stock 
of the borrowing firm provides them with recourse similar to 
the renewal process associated with short-term debt. As a 
result, the inverse relationship between the maturity of the 
debt offering and the excess return may not occur. 
To test the impact of the maturity of the debt issue, 
the maturity of the debt issue (MAT) is included in the 
regression model. The results for the maturity variable for 
industrial and utility firm~ are reported in equation 4.1 
and 4.2. The coefficients for maturity are not significant 
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for either industrial or utility firms. These results are 
consistent with the argument that the lender's ability to 
purchase common stock provides them recourse similar to the 
renewal process associated with short-term debt. 
Risk Variables 
The excess return associated with private placements of 
debt may be related to the risk of the firm issuing debt. 
Smith and Warner (1979) suggest that private placements are 
more likely to be used by riskier borrowing firms than 
public debt offerings. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that 
the stock price response to security offerings depends on 
the sensitivity of the value of the new securities to 
changes in firm value. The implication here is that the 
magnitude of the stock price response associated with 
private placements of debt may.be inversely related to the 
risk of the borrowing firm. The beta estimated with the 
market model during the estimation period is included in the 
regression model as a proxy for the risk of the borrowing 
firm. Equation 5.1 and 5.2 report the results of the 
regression analysis for industrial and utility borrowing 
firms. The coefficients for the beta are not significant 
for both utility and industrial borrowing firms. This 
implies that factors other than the risk associated with the 
borrowing firm contribute to the stock price response 
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associated with private placements of debt where the lender 
is specified. 
Insurance and Issue Related Variables 
In order to determine the impact of issue related 
variables in private placements of debt which utilize 
reputable lenders, a dummy variable for private placements 
in which an insurance company is the primary lender is 
included in the regression model along with issue related 
variables for industrial and utility borrowing firms. Table 
XXIV presents the results of the regressions. According to 
equation 7.1, the coefficient estimate for the relative size 
of the issue for industrial borrowing firms is -2.99 and is 
significant at the .OS level, whereas the coefficient for 
insurance lenders is not significant. In equation 7.2, the 
coefficients representing both relative size and insurance 
lenders are not significant for utility borrowing firms. 
Furthermore, the insurance coefficient as well as the other 
issue related variables' coefficients besides relative size 
are not significant in any of the other regression models 
for both industrial and utility borrowing firms. Therefore, 
the regression results are not materially changed when 
variables indicating reputable lenders are included in the 
regression models. 
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Special and Issue Related Variables 
To test for the impact of prestigious investment 
banking firms in private placements of debt where the lender 
is specified, a dummy variable is included in the regression 
models which equals one if a Special category of investment 
banking firms is utilized in the private placement of debt. 
The relevant results of weighted least squares regressions 
are reported in Table XXV. For industrial borrowing firms, 
the coefficient for the relative size of the issue is the 
only significant variable in the regression models. This 
indicates that factors other than issue related variables 
associated with private placements which utilize prestigious 
investment banking firms contribute to the stock price 
response associated with private placements of debt where 
the lender is specified. 
For utility borrowing firms the coefficients of the 
Special category of investment banking firms is negative and 
statistically significant in each of the regression models. 
This indicates that private placements by utility firms 
which utilize a prestigious investment banking firm have a 
negative impact on firm value. This result provides further 
support for the argument that utility regulation, rather 
than the certification and monitoring role of prestigious 
investment bankers helps alleviate information asymmetries 
associated with security issues by utilities. In equation 
14.2, the Special coefficient is -1.09 and is significant at 
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TABLE XXIV 
ESTIMATES OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS WHERE THE 
LENDER IS SPECIFIED FOR INDUSTRIAL FIRMS AND UTILITY 
FIRMS FOR ISSUES RELATED VARIABLES AND A DUMMY 
VARIABLE REPRESENTING INSURANCE 
COMPANY LENDERS 
Variable Coefficient Insurance Constant R2 
Equ. (t-.stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (F) 
SIZE 
6.1 .00 .38 1. 24 .005 
(. 71) (1. 21) (. 09) (. 78) 
6.2 .006 .22 4.86 .02 
(1.15) (. 45) (. 16) (. 69) 
REL SIZE 
7.1 -2.99 .27 21. 45 
.o~ (-2.42)b (. 87) ( 1. 38) (3.6) 
7.2 1.79 .18 13.29 .01 
(. 76) (. 37) (. 45) (. 32) 
LOG MV 
8.1 -.01 .42 13.75 .005 
(-.46) (1.28) (. 49) (. 81) 
8.2 .06 -.01 -62.54 .04 
(1.58) (-1.02) (-1.02) (1.27) 
MAT 
9.1 -.02 .34 12.39 .01 
( - • 65) ( 1. 09) (.61) (. 92) 
9.2 .03 .09 5.50 .01 
(. 77) (. 19) ( .15) (. 33) 
BETA 
10.1 -.04 .37 5.12 .01 
(-.13) ( 1. 20) (. 22) (. 72) 
10.2 .66 -.05 -4.08 .02 
(1.19) (-.10) (-.12) (. 75) 
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TABLE XXV 
ESTIMATES OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS WHERE THE 
LENDER IS SPECIFIED FOR INDUSTRIAL FIRMS AND UTILITY 
FIRMS FOR ISSUE RELATED VARIABLES AND A DUMMY 
VARIABLE REPRESENTING THE SPECIAL CATEGORY 
OF INVESTMENT BANKING FIRMS 
Variable Coefficient Special Constant R2 
Equ. (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (F) 
SIZE 
11.1 -.01 .55 6.72 .006 
(-.28) ( 1. 32) (. 59) (. 92) 
11. 2 .01 
-1. 04 b 35.99 .l°t, 
(1.57) (-,2.27) (1. 37) ( 3. 2) 
REL SIZE 
12.1 -3.10 .48 23.25 
.03b (-2.52)a ( 1. 27) (1.78)c (4.1) 
12.2 1. 44 -.88 47.25 .07 
(. 64) (-1.93)c (1.69)c (2.13) 
LOG MV 
13.1 -.008 .53 15.55 .006 
(-. 36) (1. 37) (. 56) (. 94) 
13.2 .08 -1. 09 -58.18 
.13b 
(2.13)b (-2.42)b (-. 99) (4.3) 
MAT 
14.1 -.02 .55 11. 56 .009 
(-1. 01) (1. 46) (1.13) (1.39) 
14.2 .04 -.99 26.20 .08 
( 1. 20) (-2.16)b (. 76) (2.6)c 
BETA 
15.1 -.10 .53 12.16 .006 
(-.31) (1.36) (. 56) (. 92) 
15.2 .37 -.79 34.62 .07 
(. 6 7) (-1.95)c (. 84) (2.15) 
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the .OS level and the coefficient for LOG MV is +.08 and is 
also significant at the .OS level. This is consistent with 
the argument that utility regulation helps to reduce 
information asymmetries, although private placements by 
larger utilities have a favorable effect on firm value. 
Insurance, Special, and Issue 
Related Variables 
In order to determine the relative importance of 
prestigious investment banking firms and reputable lenders, 
a dummy variable is included in the regression models for 
private placements which utilize the Special category of 
investment bankers and a dummy variable is included for 
private placements where the primary lender is an insurance 
company. Table XXVI presents the results of regression 
analysis. For industrial borrowing firms, the only variable 
that is significant in the regression models is relative 
size. For utility borrowing firms, the coefficient of the 
insurance company variable is not statistically significant 
in any of the regression models. Furthermore, the 
coefficient estimate for Special is negative and 
statistically significant in each of the regression models 
for utility borrowing firms. These results provide further 
support for the argument that utility regulation helps 
reduce information asymmetries associated with security 
issues. 
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TABLE XXVI 
ESTIMATES OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS WHERE THE 
LENDER IS SPECIFIED FOR INDUSTRIAL FIRMS AND UTILITY 
FIRMS FOR ISSUE RELATED VARIABLES AND A DUMMY 
VARIABLE REPRESENTING INSURANCE COMPANY 
LENDERS AND A DUMMY VARIABLE 
REPRESENTING THE SPECIAL 
CATEGORY OF INVESTMENT 
BANKING FIRM 
CATEGORIES 
Variable Coefficient Insurance Special Constant R2 
Equ. (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (F) 
SIZE 
16.1 -.01 .44 .63 -7.45 .01 
(-.28) (1. 42) (1.51) (-.49) (1. 28) 
16.2 .007 .02 -1. 03 35.11 .10 
(1.55) (. 05) (-2.2l)b (1. 09) (2.12) 
REL SIZE 
17.1 -2.92 .34 .54 11. 35 
.03b 
(-2.32)b ( 1. 09) (1. 43) (. 67) ( 3. 1) 
17.2 1. 42 -.03 -.88 48.40 .07 
(. 61) (-.06) (-1.87)c (1. 40) (1. 39) 
LOG MV 
18.1 -.03 .58 .71 15.53 .02 
(-1.00) (1.70)c (1.77)c (. 56) ( 1. 59) 
18.2 
.08 b -.32 -1.17 -55.58 .13b 
(2.22) (-.67) (-2.50)b (-. 94) (3.0) 
MAT 
19.1 -.02 .41 .63 4.41 .01 
(-.85) (1.31) (1. 63) (. 21) ( 1. 50) 
19.2 .04 -.15 -1. 03 30.44 .08 
(1.22) (-. 32) (2.16)b (. 82) (1.79) 
BETA 
20.1 -.17 .47 .64 12.16 .006 
(-.54) (1.49) (1.62) (. 07) (1.36) 
20.2 .41 -.16 -.81 37.56 .07 
(. 7 3) (-.34) (-1.67)c (. 89) (1. 45) 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Sununary of Empirical Results 
This study investigates the stock price response 
associated with announcements of private placements of debt. 
The excess return associated with announcements of private 
placements of debt where the lender is specified is +.38% 
with a z-statistic of 2.33 which is significantly different 
from zero at the .01 level. Although the excess return for 
private placements where no lender is identified in the 
private placement announcement is +.07%, it is not 
significant. These results indicate that borrowing firms 
that specify the lender participating in the private 
placement avoid the non-positive stock price response 
associated with public debt offerings noted by Eckbo 
(1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Dann and Mikkelson 
(1984). The findings of this study are also in sharp 
contrast to the negative stock price response associated 
with private placements of debt where no emphasis was placed 
on the borrowing firm or lender participating in the private 
placement documented by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and 
James (1987). Therefore, the results of this study indicate 
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that announcements of private placements of debt which 
specify participating lenders convey favorable information 
about borrowing firms to the capital market. 
The positive excess return associated with private 
placements of debt in which the lender is specified provides 
support for the argument that high quality borrowing firm's 
may signal their true value by placing debt privately with 
' 
reputable lenders. Lenders are given access to _private 
information about the borrowing firm during the private 
placement process. Completion of the private placement 
indicates that a reputable lender is willing to provide 
capital to the borrowing firm, thus providing a signal of 
their confidence in the future financial prospects of the 
borrowing firm. These results are also consistent with the 
argument that there is increased monitoring resulting from 
the private placement, particularly given that a specified 
lender is performing monitoring activities. 
Although the excess return associated with the full 
sample of private placements by utility borrowing firms is 
+.45% which is significant at the .05 level, there is no 
statistically significant difference between private 
placements by utility borrowing firms where the lender is 
specified and where no lender is specified. These results 
are consistent with the findings of Szewczyk and Varma 
(1991) and provides further support for the argument that 
utility regulation, rather than the role of the lender, 
helps reduce information asymmetries associated with 
security offerings by utility firms. 
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One possible explanation for the positive excess return 
associated with private placements of debt in which the 
lender is specified is that the market perceives that 
particular categories of lenders participating in the 
private placement provide a stronger signal regarding firm 
value relative to other lenders. An analysis of the stock 
response associated with private placements of debt where 
the lender is an insurance company, pension fund, or 
financial firm indicates that the significantly positive 
excess return noted in the full sample is primarily 
attributable to private placements in which the lender is an 
insurance company. The excess return resulting from 
announcements of private placements of debt where an 
insurance company is the lender is +.40% with a z-statistic 
of 2.15 which is statistically significant at the .05 level. 
We conclude that insurance companies have developed a 
reputation of providing effective monitoring and 
certification services due to their expertise in the private 
placement debt market. Insurance companies may also 
purchase shares of the borrowing firm's common stock and 
thus affect the firm's activities throughout the loan. This 
provides insura.nce companies with additional recourse 
relative to other lenders in private placements who may face 
restrictions on the amount and type of securities that they 
may purchase. Therefore, announcements of private 
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placements which identify an insurance company as the lender 
convey positive information about the value of the borrowing 
firm as a result of the reputation of insurance companies as 
lenders in private placements of debt. 
The excess return associated with private placements 
which specify two participating lenders (LEND2) is 1.16% 
which is significant at the .05 level. However, when 
industrial and utility borrowing firms are analyzed 
separately, the excess return associated with LEND2 
subsamples are not significant. The excess returns for 
other multiple lender categories are also not significant. 
Given the mixed results associated with multiple lenders in 
private placements and the positive stock price response for 
when the lender is a single insurance company, we conclude 
that the reputation of the lender rather than the number of 
lenders is the more important factor contributing to the 
stock price response for private placements of debt where 
the lender is specified. 
Another possible explanation for the stock price 
response associated with private placements of debt is the 
monitoring and certification role of investment bankers. 
The excess return for the full sample of private placements 
which specified a prestigious investment banker is +.14% 
which is not statistically significant. However, the stock 
price response associated with private placements of debt by 
industrial borrowing firms which specified an insurance 
company and a prestigious investment banking firm is +1.48% 
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which is significant at the .01 level. This indicates that 
the monitoring and certification role of reputable 
investment bankers and reputable lenders helps reduce 
information asymmetries associated with security offerings. 
Finally, the excess returns associated with subsamples of 
lenders and investment banking firm categories for private 
placements by utility firms are not significant. This 
result provides support for the argument that utility 
regulation, rather than monitoring and certification by a 
reputable lender and/or a reputable investment banking firm 
helps reduce information asymmetries associated with 
security offerings by utilities. 
Regression analysis indicates a significantly negative 
relationship between the excess return associated with 
private placements by utility borrowing firm's and a dummy 
variable representing the Special category of investment 
bankers. This result supports the argument that utility 
regulation helps reduce information asymmetries associated 
with private placements of debt by utility firms. The 
results of regression analysis for industrial borrowing 
firms indicate a negative relationship between the excess 
return and the relative size of the debt issue. This result 
is puzzling given that apriori a positive relationship was 
expected for size variables and the ~cess return associated 
with private placements of debt by industrial firms where 
the lender is specified. This implies that other factors 
associated with the debt issue, such as risk factors or 
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potential agency problems resulting from the debt issue, are 
not captured in the regression model. These issues will be 
considered further in future research. 
Implications forFuture Research 
The significantly positive excess return associated 
with private placements of debt in which t.he lender is 
specified has implications for future research regarding 
private placements of other types of securities, such as 
preferred stock, convertible debt, convertible preferred 
stock, and common stock. Although Wruck (1989) found a 
positive excess return associated with announcements of 
private placements of common stock and Fields and Mais 
(1991) found a positive excess return associated with 
announcements of private placements of convertible debt, the 
focus of these studies was on the stock price response 
associated with private placements of particular types of 
securities, with no emphasis placed on the role of the 
lender participating in the private placement. If the 
market perceives that the lender specified in the private 
placement announcement conveys positive information 
regarding the future prospects of th.e borrowing firm, then a 
positive stock price response would be expected to be 
associated with private placements of other types of 
securities. 
In a related context the positive excess return 
associated with private placements in which an insurance 
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company is the primary lender has implications for future 
research. One possible explanation for the significant 
excess return regards the expertise and unique role of 
insurance companies irt the private placement debt market. 
Further research is necessary to identify that unique 
service or role of insurance companies in private placements 
of debt and to explain its relation to the market value of 
the firm. Moreover, the wealth impact associated with other 
types of security offerings in which insurance companies are 
the primary lenders should also be examined in order to 
determine whether the excess return associated with 
insurance companies is attributable to their role in the 
private placement market or is unique to their participation 
in private placements of debt. 
The results of this study also have implications for 
future research regarding the wealth impact associated with 
announcements of bank loans. James (1987) provides evidence 
that banks provide some special service associated with 
their lending activity that is not available from other 
lenders. Lummer and McConnell (1989) suggest that 
announcements of bank loans send a positive signal to the 
capital market as a result of a continuing relationship 
between the bank and the borrowing firm which is developed 
over time. However, neither of these studies examined the 
role of the number of banks providing funds to borrowing 
firms. A positive excess return associated with 
announcements of bank loans which specify two participating 
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lenders would provide support for the argument that two 
banks are providing quality certification of the borrowing 
firm, thus sending a positive signal to the market regarding 
the future prospects of the borrowing firm. Moreover, a 
positive stock price response would also provide support for 
the argument that there is.increased monitoring associated 
with announcements of bank loans which specify two lenders, 
because more than one specified .bank is providing monitoring 
activities. 
In a related context, the impact of the number of 
lenders participating in private placements of other types 
of security offerings should also be examined. A positive 
excess return associated with private placements of other 
types of securities which specify two participating lenders 
would provide further support for the argument that 
completion of the private placement conveys positive 
information regarding the borrowing firm to the capital 
market. 
Finally, the role of investment bankers in private 
placement offerings should be examined in future research. 
Slovin, Sushkar and Hudson (1990) and Hansen and Torregrosa 
(1992) suggest that monitoring and certification services by 
reputable lenders help reduce information asymmetries 
associated with security offerings. Although there is a 
positive excess return associated with private placement by 
industrial borrowing firms which utilize a reputable lender 
and prestigious investment banker, the results associated 
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with the impact of investment banking firm categories are 
not conclusive. Therefore, further research is necessary to 
determine the impact of the monitoring and certification 
roles of investment banking firms in private placement 
offerings. 
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